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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 30, 1995, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided the
case brought by Portugal against Australia concerning the Timor Gap Treaty.1
The Treaty2 covers a maritime area between northern Australia and East
t B.A. (Juris.); L.L.B. (Hons.), University of Adelaide, Australia. The author wishes to
acknowledge the advice and encouragement of Professor Hilary Charlesworth in the preparation of this
Article.
1. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), General List No. 84, 1995 I.C.J. _ (June 30) [hereinafter East
Thnor]. The vote was fourteen to two.
2. Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation, Dec. 11, 1989, Austl.-Indon., 1991 Austl. T.S. No. 9
[hereinafter Timor Gap Treaty] (entered into force Feb. 9, 1991). For Australian legislation implementing
the Timor Gap Treaty, see Petroleum (Australia-Indonesia Zone of Cooperation) Act, AUsTL. C. ACTS
(1990); Petroleum (Australia-Indonesia Zone of Cooperation) (Consequential Provisions) Act, AUSTL. C.
ACTS (1990).
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Timor - the Timor Gap - and establishes a zone of cooperation that allows
exploration and exploitation of the petroleum resources of the Timor Gap.
The creation of this zone between the two states was a compromise over
competing claims regarding the continental shelf. Portugal's action in the ICJ
not only effectively challenged the validity of this treaty and jeopardized the
operations of mining companies in the zone, but also demonstrated the
dynamics of resolving multilateral disputes by international adjudication in the
ICJ. The Case Concerning East Timor has also focused international attention
on the struggle of the East Timorese to exercise their rights of self-
determination and permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. The
Timor Gap Treaty provided the legal basis for Portugal's action. Portugal
alleged that, by entering into the Treaty with Indonesia, Australia breached
obligations owed both to Portugal as administering power of East Timor and
to the people of East Timor.4 Portugal contended that Australia breached
international law by failing to observe the rights of the East Timorese to self-
determination, territorial integrity, and permanent sovereignty over natural
resources. 5 Australia responded that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide
the claims of Portugal, that these claims were inadmissible and in the
alternative, regardless of whether the Court found jurisdiction, that Australia
had not breached Portugal's rights under international law.7 In its second
submission, Australia argued that, in order to protect its sovereign rights, it
was entitled to treat Indonesia as the state in actual and effective control of the
territory because the United Nations did not impose any obligation of
nonrecognition on third parties.8 As the questions of jurisdiction and
admissibility were inextricably linked with the substance of the case, Australia
argued them together.' The ICJ found that it could not determine the legality
of the Timor Gap Treaty without first determining the lawfulness of
Indonesia's military invasion and subsequent incorporation of East Timor. 10
Consequently, the Court refused to hear the merits of the case between
Portugal and Australia on the grounds that Indonesia was not a party to the
dispute and refused to accept the Court's jurisdiction. 11
3. Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2.
4. East 7imor, supra note 1, para. 10.
5. Counter-Memorial of the Government of Australia, East Tinor (Port. v. Austl.) (East Timor) 99
(June 1, 1992) [hereinafter Counter-Memorial of Australia].
6. An objection to the admissibility of a claim is "a plea that the tribunal should rule the claim to
be inadmissible on some ground other than its ultimate merits," whereas an objection to the jurisdiction
of the Court is "a plea that the tribunal itself is incompetent to give any ruling at all whether as to the
merits or as to the admissibility of the claim." Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the
International Court ofJustice, 1951-54: Questions ofJurisdiction, Competence and Procedure, 1958 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 12-13.
7. East 2imor, supra note 1, para. 10.
8. Counter-Memorial of Australia, supra note 5, 350, 355.
9. East 7imor, supra note 1, para. 4.
10. Id. para. 33.
11. The methods of accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ are in THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE arts. 36, 37 [hereinafter STATUTE OF THE ICJ]. Article 36 provides:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all
matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and
conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as
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The political core of the dispute between Portugal and Australia was
Indonesia's military invasion of the former Portuguese colony of Timor in late
1975 and its continuing presence there. The group claiming to represent the
majority of the people of East Timor was the Frente Revoluciondria Timor
Leste (FRETILIN).' 2 In the aftermath of the Portuguese revolution in April
1974, FRETILIN, the Unido Democrdtica Timorense (UDT), and the
Associago Popular Democrdtica de Timor (APODETI) were the three
principal political parties in East Timor. 3 Portugal's effort in 1975 to
encourage cooperation among the parties failed, and the UDT attempted a
coup. 14 FRETILIN then launched a countercoup, which enabled FRETILIN
to secure large parts of the territory.' 5 Portugal was unable to prevent the
ensuing civil war and withdrew its local administration to the island of
Atauro, where it remained until the Indonesian invasion.16 FRETILIN
unilaterally declared independence and proclaimed the formation of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.' 7 UDT and
APODETI condemned this action and issued a joint declaration stating their
wish to establish formal ties with Indonesia 8 and calling on Indonesia to
support them against FRETILIN. Indonesia obliged by invading East Timor
and occupying the island. Indonesia justified its action based on the argument
that two of the major political parties in East Timor sought to integrate with
Indonesia in the exercise of their right of self-determination. 9 Portugal made
compulsory ipsofacto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation.
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of
reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.
4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who
shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.
5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present
Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
for the period which they still have to run and in accordance with their terms.
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled
by the decision of the Court.
Article 37 provides: "Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to a
tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International
Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court
of Justice."
12. Paul D. Elliott, The East 71mor Dispute, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 238, 240 (1978). On
FRETILIN's historical claim to represent the people of East Timor, see, e.g., LetterDated 8 July 1976
from the Representative of Mozambique to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/12133 (1976) (transmitting letter from Jos6 Ramos Horta addressed to Secretary-General and
communiqu6 from Central Committee of FRETILIN).
13. Elliott, supra note 12, at 238-39.
14. Id. at 239.
15. Id. at 239, 245.
16. Id. at 239.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 241.
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no attempt to resist or repel the Indonesian armed forces and almost
immediately withdrew from the area. Furthermore, Portugal passed an
amendment to its constitution ending its treatment of East Timor's status as
part of Portugal.2" Portugal effectively took no further action with regard to
East Timor until 1980, when it undertook diplomatic initiatives in the United
Nations General Assembly. 21 Australia initially voiced its objection to
Indonesia's use of force, but later recognized the continuing reality of
Indonesia's control over East Timor. It accorded Indonesia's incorporation of
East Timor de facto recognition in January 1978 as a precursor to negotiations
concerning the Timor Gap.' De jure recognition was thus implied when
negotiations commenced a year later. The ICJ's decision not to address the
substantive issues in East Timor has been hailed as a political triumph for
Australia. According to Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs and
Australia's Ambassador to The Hague, this decision "remove[d] any possible
uncertainty about Australia's rights in the Timor Gap"' and "totally
vindicated the arguments put by Australia."24 The decision could be
considered a victory for the East Timorese because it confirmed both their
right of self-determination and East Timor's status as a non-self-governing
territory despite Indonesian control. The Portuguese government stated that
it did not view the case as a failure, as it had brought East Timor to public
notice. Portugal announced that it intended to continue pressing for East
Timor's right to self-determination through the United Nations and through
efforts in the diplomatic arena.26
This Article attempts to put the East Timor decision in its legal context
by studying the Court's treatment of the concept of necessary parties. The
term "necessary parties" refers to those entities whose interests and rights
form the "very subject matter of the dispute"27 such that they must be
represented before the ICJ for determination of a case. The doctrine of
necessary parties was not only highly relevant in East Timor because of the
absence of Indonesia, a signatory of the Timor Gap Treaty, but also because
of the absence of the people of East Timor. However, while the East
Timorese's right of self-determination was a fundamental issue in the case, the
Timorese were not and could not be considered a necessary party because the
20. Counter-Memorial of Australia, supra note 5, 44 (outlining article 307 of Portuguese
constitution, as amended in 1976, and included as article 293 of 1989 revision of constitution).
21. Id. annex 7 (cable from Australian Embassy, Lisbon containing translated excerpts of interview
by Portuguese Foreign Minister to Expresso newspaper, May 10, 1980: "IT]here has been no initiative
from the governments which preceded us and . . . none took any initiative to resolve [the East Timor]
problem whose human and political aspects are so delicate and so serious").
22. See id. annexes 12-17 (reprinting reports of statements made by Australian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Dec. 7-29, 1975).
23. AUSTRALIAN DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, BRIEFING PAPERS ON PORTUGAL V.
AUSTRALIA (July 1995).
24. Helen Trinca, Canberra Wins Timor Court Case, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, July 1-2, 1995, at 1-2
(quoting Michael Tate, Australian Ambassador to The Hague).
25. See Helen Trinca, World Court Bypass Leaves Gap in East Thnor Debate, AUSTRALIAN, July
3, 1995, at 13 (citing statement by Miguel Galv~o Teles, Portuguese counsel).
26. Helen Trinca & Maria Ceresa, East imor Will Use ICI Ruling to Pressure Canberra,
AUSTRALIAN, July 3, 1995, at 2.
27. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K., U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19, 32
(June 15).
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traditional definition of necessary parties only extends to states; they therefore
relied upon Portugal to adjudicate their claim on their behalf. Portugal,
therefore, brought the action against Australia in its capacity as administering
power of East Timor. The ICI reaffirmed the significance of the doctrine of
necessary parties by finding that Indonesia was such a necessary party in East
Timor.
In order to study the issues that arise from the international legal doctrine
of necessary parties, I will draw on a theory proposed by Antonio Cassese in
International Law in a Divided World.28 Cassese's theory identifies two
stages in the development of international law. The first is the "Westphalian
model," 29 or traditional international law, and is based on the notion of a
community of sovereign states in which the sovereignty of a state can only be
restricted through its consent.3" The fundamental notion of this model is the
independent existence of states whose international relations are governed by
self-interest. The second model, which has expanded the scope of traditional
international law, is classified as the "U.N. Charter model."31 Under this
model states remain the primary subjects of international law, but a role in
interstate relations exists for organized peoples, international organizations,
and individuals. While the Westphalian model emphasizes realism, Cassese
considers the U.N. Charter model to be more idealistic,32 since its rules do
not necessarily represent the current situation in international law but instead
reflect a series of hortatory goals for the world community. In fact, the main
feature of this model is a set of rules "aimed at introducing greater justice into
international relations."" 3 Cassese does not argue that the U.N. Charter
model has definitively replaced the Westphalian model; rather, the two models
coexist.
3 4
The coexistence of the Westphalian and the U.N. Charter models reflects
the complex and interwoven nature of the competing interests that the ICJ
must balance in its role as principal judicial organ of the United Nations. The
ICJ adheres to the fundamental tenets of international law encapsulated in the
Westphalian model, while it also complements and develops international
jurisprudence through the U.N. Charter model, a more value oriented
approach to international law. The ICJ enhances its own credibility and
28. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD (1986).
29. This stage began at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and lasted until the end of World War I.
Id. at 38.
30. In this community, states cooperated minimally with each other, and force was the primary
means of legitimation and of settling disputes. This system of international relations reflected the imbalance
of power that existed between European states and developing countries at the time. Cassese remarks that
"[t]raditional international law made up a 'realistic' body of legal rules, for it actually sanctioned the
existing power relationships." Id. at 400.
31. This stage began after World War I. Although faint, it intensified after World War II, and
extends to the present day. Id. at 397-98.
32. Cassese argues that international law has become more value oriented. This trend is evidenced
through the development of human rights law, the creation of peremptory norms of international law, the
creation of rights and duties binding the international community as a whole, and the acceptance of certain
principles forming the foundation of international rules. Also, the U.N. Charter model addresses the social
and economic inequalities that the Westphalian model ignored. Id. at 398-99.
33. Id. at 399.
34. See id. at 163.
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legitimacy, and thereby advances international law, successfully balancing the
Westphalian and U.N. Charter models rather than confining itself to the
traditional concepts of international law. Indeed, the international standing of
the ICJ is favorably influenced when the Court's consistent application of
traditional international law is tempered by the fundamental notions of fairness
and equity that are inherent in the justice of the U.N. Charter model. The
interplay between these two models accounts for the political and social
changes that influence the work of the ICJ and contributes to an understanding
of the application of the necessary parties doctrine.
I argue in this Article, however, that the ICJ has not taken a consistent
approach to the issue of necessary parties in international adjudication.
Instead, it has oscillated between the U.N. Charter model and the Westphalian
model. The Court has alternately favored an approach that strictly confines
disputes to a bilateral character in order to protect the sovereignty of states,
and a more expansive approach that considers the wider dimensions of a
dispute in order to satisfy equity. The "Westphalian" tendency of the Court
in East Timor will also be analyzed against the background of earlier decisions
on the doctrine of necessary parties.
The first half of this Article addresses limitations to the Court's
jurisdiction arising from the doctrine of necessary parties. Part I analyzes the
consensual jurisdiction of the ICJ as a limit to the effectiveness of the Court
and its decisions. A state can only be brought before the Court if it accepts
the Court's jurisdiction,3" potentially creating a situation in which a
respondent must defend itself without the participation of a third state that has
not accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ and that may be equally culpable in the
eyes of the respondent. Part II focuses on the ICJ's tendency to invoke article
59 of the Court's statute as a form of protection of third party rights. The
Court's inclination to restrict itself to bilateral disputes is reflected in cases
that hold that absent parties are protected because the Court's decision is not
binding on them. A continuing emphasis on states as individual entities that
are only bound by their consent is indicative of the Westphalian order. The
Court in East Timor reinforced this emphasis by finding Indonesia's consent
to the resolution of the dispute imperative despite the possible application of
erga omnes rights and obligations.36 The Court also failed to address the
international implications of any decision that commented on the right of the
East Timorese to self-determination. Part III discusses how a state may be a
"necessary party" because of the role it is required to play in the proceedings
before the ICJ. A state may be a necessary party because it possesses
evidence, or because its responsibility must be determined as a preliminary
step, or to apportion fault. These issues were examined in East Timor with
respect to Indonesia and the East Timorese. In order to ensure that justice had
been served the U.N. Charter model would have required the Court to
consider the wider import of the proceedings before it. The final part argues
that subjects other than states, particularly organized peoples, can constitute
35. See STATUTE OF THE ICJ arts. 36-37.
36. Erga omnes rights and obligations are those binding on the international community as a whole.
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
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necessary parties to a dispute if their rights and duties are inexorably linked
to a dispute between or against a state or states. The U.N. Charter model
recognizes that entities other than states can have a role in international law.
The East Timorese, I will argue, constitute precisely this kind of entity.
II. CONSENT AND NECESSARY PARTIES IN MULTILATERAL DISPUTES
The ICJ has consistently affirmed that consent is the essential basis of its
international jurisdiction.37 The means of expressing consent to the Court's
jurisdiction are set out in the Statute of the ICJ3  to which all members of the
United Nations are parties ipso facto.39 Under article 36(1), states may
accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ in three ways; of these, two are used in
practice." Under the first, a state may refer a case to the Court, entering an
agreement "whereby two or more states agree to refer a particular and defined
matter to the Court for a decision."41 The second permits a state to refer a
matter to the Court under a multilateral or bilateral treaty. "[T]he treaty may
be one providing for the reference of a given dispute to the Court, a general
treaty of peaceful settlements of disputes, or a treaty containing a
compromissory clause."42 Article 36(2) provides a final way for states to
express their consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. Under this provision,
states unilaterally commit themselves, in advance, to accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ. The statute grants the Court no jurisdiction except by
the methods specified. Thus, the consent of the parties to a dispute sets a firm
boundary to the Court's jurisdiction. The consent of states constrains not only
the Court's jurisdiction in a dispute, but also the forms of settlement it may
impose. Traditionally, the Court has also deferred to state sovereignty in the
sense that it will not pass judgments affecting the rights or interests of states
that have not consented to adjudication or that have not agreed to be bound
by the Court's decision. In East Timor, Portugal brought its action against
Australia on the basis of their mutual acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction.
Indonesia, however, was not a party to the dispute before the ICJ. It had
neither accepted the jurisdiction of the Court under article 36(2) nor sought
to intervene in the proceedings.43 Unsurprisingly, in view of the United
37. See, e.g., Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Second Phase,
1950 I.C.J. 221 (July 18); Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A. 83 (1956); Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22).
38. STATUTE OF THE ICJ arts. 36-37.
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 93, 1. Under article 93(2), a state that is not a member of the United
Nations may become a party to the Statute of the ICJ.
40. Jurisdiction could comprise "all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations" under article 36(1), but the Charter does not specify any such matter, and so this form of
acceptance of jurisdiction is moribund. RENATA SZAFRAZ, THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 7 (1993).
41. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 333 (2d ed. 1985).
42. Id.
43. Indonesia could have argued that it had a third party legal interest that would have been affected
by the decision in the case and sought to intervene under articles 65 and 66 of the Court's Statute. The
intervention provisions in the Statute do not constitute an exception to the principle of consent. Land,
Island & Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. 92, 134-35 (Application to Intervene
by Nicar. of Sept. 13) [hereinafter Land, Island & Maritime Frontier Dispute]; Continental Shelf (Libya
v. Malta), 1984 I.C.J. 3, 22 (Application to Intervene by Italy of Mar. 21). Jurisdiction in intervention
1996]
312 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 305
Nations' reaction to the invasion of East Timor, Indonesia avoided taking part
in the case. Both the Security Council" and the General Assembly45 had
passed resolutions condemning Indonesia's intervention, calling upon it to
withdraw its forces, and calling on all states to respect the rights of the East
Timorese to self-determination. In view of the political response to Indonesia's
invasion, it is unlikely that Indonesia would have risked additional legal
condemnation by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court.
In this part, I argue that East Timor exposes the tension between the
Westphalian theory of state sovereignty and the U.N. Charter alternative. In
the past, the Court supported the Westphalian model of respect for the
autonomy of states, finding that a state not party to the proceedings before the
Court must have its interests protected if necessary.46 This allegiance,
however, was not unwavering. The Court had begun to depart from the
tradition of judicial restraint when faced with political disputes, and had
sought to extend its jurisdiction when it could do so without implicating third-
party states. In East Timor, however, the Court has again returned to a
Westphalian approach to the issue of states' consent and the doctrine of
necessary parties.
cases is not based on the consent of the parties to the case but on "the consent given by them, in becoming
parties to the Court's Statute, to the Court's exercise of its powers conferred by the Statute." Land, Island
& Maritime Frontier Dispute, supra at 133. Nicaragua made this argument and also claimed that its
interests were "so much part of the subject matter of the case that the Chamber could not properly exercise
its jurisdiction without the participation of Nicaragua." Id. at 114. The Chamber adopted a two stage
process and decided to determine first whether Nicaragua had shown the existence of a potentially affected
interest to warrant intervention. If that was found to exist, the Chamber would consider whether the
interest constituted the very subject matter of the dispute as well. Id. at 116. If only the first stage was
reached, Nicaragua would become an intervenor, not a party to the case, with the right to be heard but
without "acquir[ing] rights, or becomling] subject to the obligations, which attach to the status of a party."
Id. at 136. If Nicaragua's interest formed the "very subject matter of the dispute," the Chamber would
lack jurisdiction. The Chamber found that the legal status of the Gulf of Fonseca did affect the interests
of Nicaragua as well as Honduras and El Salvador, id. at 121, but that Nicaragua's interests did not form
the very subject matter of the dispute, id. at 122. On this basis, the degree to which an interest is affected
is of importance when determining if the consent of a particular state is required for the adjudication of
a dispute.
In East Thnor, Indonesia could not be compelled to intervene, as the ICJ has no power to join a
party to the proceedings before it. It certainly would not have been in Indonesia's interest to intervene and
risk a direct ruling that its occupation of East Timor was illegal.
44. S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1869th mtg. 4 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/384 (1975);
S.C. Res. 389, U.N. SCOR, 31st. Sess., 1914th mtg.- 44 -2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/389 (1976).
45. G.A. Res. 3485, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 2439th plen. mtg. 11, 4-5, 7, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/3485 (1975) was passed immediately after the invasion. Resolutions were then passed yearly until
1982 calling upon Indonesia to respect the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and expressing
concern about the humanitarian situation in East Timor. See G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., 85th
plen. mtg. 11-2, 4-6, U.N. Doc. AIRESI31/53 (1976); G.A. Res. 34, U.N. GAOR, 32nd Sess., 83rd
plen. mtg. 11-3, 7, U.N. Doc. A1RESI32134 (1977); G.A. Res. 39, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., 81st plen.
mtg. 11-2, U.N. Doc. A1RES133139 (1978); G.A. Res. 40, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 75th plen. mtg.
44 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34140 (1979); G.A. Res. 27, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., 57th plen. mtg. 111-2,
4, U.N. Doe. A/RES/35/27 (1980); G.A. Res. 50, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess, 70th plen. mtg. 11-3, 5,
U.N. Doe. A/RES/36/50 (1981); G.A. Res. 30, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 77th plen. mtg. 11, 3, U.N.
Doc. AIRESI37/30 (1982).
46. See Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K., U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19
(June 15); Advisory Opinion No. 5, Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5 (July 23).
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A. Consent and State Sovereignty
Traditionally, the ICJ has protected state sovereignty by limiting its
jurisdiction to the resolution of disputes among consenting states. It adopted
this approach explicitly in Monetary Gold,47 the seminal case on the concept
of necessary parties." In East Timor, the Court reaffirmed the requirement
of the consent of any state it considered to be a necessary party before
considering the case on its merits. The majority opinion, which emphasizes
that the independent existence of states is restricted only by consent, is
suggestive of the Westphalian model, and is in line with Monetary Gold.
Under Monetary Gold, the Court will not adjudicate a dispute, where the
interests of a given state form the "very subject matter" of the dispute, and
that state has not consented to ICJ jurisdiction in the matter.
Monetary Gold arose out of a dispute relating to the distribution of
gold49 among countries that could establish that a definite amount of the
precious metal belonging to them had been looted by Germany or wrongfully
removed to German territory during World War II. France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States created the Tripartite Commission to deal
with the claims. When Italy and Albania laid competing claims to a single
reserve, the three governments of the Tripartite Commission, in accordance
with the Washington Agreement, submitted the matter to arbitration.50 An
arbitrator determined that the gold removed from Rome in 1943 belonged to
Albania. Under the Washington Statement, which was signed at the same time
as the Agreement, the governments of France, the United States, and the
United Kingdom agreed that should this determination be made, the gold
would go to the United Kingdom, not Albania, in partial satisfaction of the
judgment in Corfu Channel."t On a proviso to the Washington Statement,
France, the United States, and the United Kingdom accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ, should either Italy or Albania lodge applications with
it. Albania could have appealed to the Court to determine whether it was
proper to deliver the gold to the United Kingdom, but made no such
application. Italy, however, made an application to the ICJ for a determination
as to whether its claim to the gold was the stronger. The Washington
47. Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. at 19.
48. In its advisory opinion on Eastern Carelia, the Permanent Court of International Justice, the ICJ's
predecessor, founded its decision on the principle of necessary consent, a principle it derived from the
doctrine of state sovereignty. See Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. at 27. The Court was asked to determine
whether a declaration as to the autonomy of Eastern Carelia asserted in the protocol of signature relative
to the Treaty of Peace signed between Russia and Finland in 1920 was a binding international obligation.
The Court found that to give an opinion on such a matter would decide an actual dispute between Finland
and Russia. Russia was not a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court and formally declined to take
part in the proceedings. Id. at 12-13. Under these circumstances, the Permanent Court refused to give an
opinion, stating: "It is well-established in international law that no state can, without its consent, be
compelled to submit its dispute with other states either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind
of pacific settlement." Id. at 27.
49. Monetary gold is held in the national bank of a state and intended to back the currency of that
state.
50. Agreement for the Submission to an Arbitrator, Apr. 25, 1951, Fr.-U.K.-U.S., 91 U.N.T.S. 21.
51. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). There, the ICJ found Albania to be
internationally responsible and liable to compensate Britain for damage caused to British ships by a mine
that exploded in Albanian territorial waters.
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Statement provided that Italy possessed this right as a result of an Albanian
law of January 13, 1945 concerning Albania's alleged confiscation of-the
assets of the National Bank of Albania, which were largely owned by the
Italian government.5 2 Italy argued that it had a claim for indemnification for
an alleged international wrong that Albania had committed by passing that
law. According to Italy, this meant that the Court did not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon the question of priority of claims to the gold without the
consent of Albania as any decision on the merits would effectively involve the
determination of a dispute between Italy and Albania rather than a
determination of a dispute between Italy and the United Kingdom.
Accepting this argument, the ICJ stated: "To adjudicate upon the
international responsibility of Albania without her consent would run counter
to a well-established principle of international law embodied in the Court's
Statute, namely, that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a state with
its consent."' Since Albania had neither expressly nor impliedly consented
to the Court's jurisdiction in the matter, and since Albania's "legal interests
would not only be affected by the decision, but would form the very subject
matter of the decision," 4 the Court held that it would not decide the case in
its absence. The Monetary Gold principle reflects the fundamental notion of
state sovereignty and the requirement of consent.
This point was reiterated by the Court in East Timor: "One of the
fundamental principles of the Court's Statute is that it cannot decide a dispute
between states without the consent of those states to its jurisdiction."
55
Australia argued that its consent was not sufficient, under article 36(2), for the
Court to proceed to determine the case since the rights and interests of
Indonesia under the Timor Gap Treaty were also directly at issue. Australia
submitted that Portugal sought, in effect, to challenge the validity of the
Treaty, so that the consent of both contracting parties was required.56
Portugal, of course, did not bring an action against Indonesia because
Indonesia, unlike Australia, had not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court. The Timor Gap Treaty creates reciprocal rights and obligations
between Australia and Indonesia, and thus Australia argued that "[t]o
challenge the existence or legality of Australia's duty to perform the Treaty
is, necessarily, to challenge the existence or legality of Indonesia's right to
have the Treaty performed.""7
Portugal argued that Australia's international obligations were independent
of the actions of Indonesia 8 and favored a narrow interpretation of Monetary
52. Italy also argued its right to the gold under the provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty. This claim,
however, was dismissed for failure to invoke the provisions in the proceedings. Treaty of Peace with Italy,
Feb. 10, 1947, U.S.-Italy, T.I.A.S. No. 1648.
53. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K., U.S.), 1954 l.C.J. 19, 32
(June 15).
54. Id.
55. East Timor, supra note 1, para. 26.
56. Counter-Memorial of Australia, supra note 5, 6-11, 17.
57. Id. 190.
58. East Tmor, supra note 1, para. 25. Portugal could have argued, for example, that Australia had
independent obligations under Security Council resolutions, which are considered binding under article 25
of the U.N. Charter. Sasha Stepan, Portugal's Action in the International Court of Justice Against
Australia Concerning the imor Gap Treaty, 18 MELB. U. L. REV. 918, 921 (1992).
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Gold whereby the Court was prevented from deciding a case for jurisdictional
reasons only if it was asked for a decision that was binding on an absent
state. 9 According to this reasoning, Australia could be independently sued
for violating its duty to treat East Timor as a self-governing territory and its
duty to treat Portugal as its de jure administering power.60 Furthermore,
Portugal argued that the former duty was independent of the latter. It was
submitted that Australia had violated a duty not to recognize a state's claim
to sovereignty over territory acquired by the use of force. Portugal's
arguments raised two fundamental issues: the binding and authoritative nature
of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions with regard to the self-
determination of former colonial peoples and the significance of rights and
duties erga omnes.6" Had the Court reached these issues, its treatment of
them would have carried implications for the entire international community.
Any decision on the merits would have been no more binding on Indonesia
than on any other member of the international community except Australia.
Nonetheless, the majority of the Court applied Monetary Gold and held that
"Australia's behavior cannot be assessed without first entering into the
question why it is that Indonesia could not lawfully have concluded the 1989
Treaty, while Portugal allegedly could have done so."62 Indonesia's rights
and obligations were found to constitute the "very subject matter" of tue
dispute. The Court was therefore unable to determine the merits of the case
in the absence of Indonesia's consent.63
The dissenting judgments of ad hoc Judge Skubiszewski and Judge
Weeramantry did not subscribe to the majority's view of consent as the
paramount issue. Both judges agreed that the acts of Australia could be
separated from those of Indonesia64 and that the Court should have decided
the dispute "in accordance with the demands of justice."65 Judge
Skubiszewski rejected an overly technical approach and advocated a high
degree of understanding of the situation in view of the application of the
principle of self-determination.66 Judge Weeramantry also opposed a narrow
approach that would prevent the Court from reaching a determination of the
case. 67 He believed that a balance must be struck between the necessary
party rule and the ICJ's judicial duty to decide a dispute.68 Judge
59. Miguel GalvAo Teles, The Political and Legal Aspects of Ponrtugal's Action Against Australia in
the Case Concerning East Timor, in INT'L L. ASS'N (AUSTL. BRANCH), THE EAST TIMOR CASE IN THE
ICJ 24, 34 (Martin Place Papers No. 4, M. Brewster & I.A. Shearer eds., 1995) (emphasis added).
60. East 7tinor, supra note 1, para. 10; see also Teles, supra note 59, at 28-29 ("The duties for the
violation of which Australia was brought to the Court were the ones not to disregard ... : the duty not
to deal in relation to East Timor as if it was not a non-self-governing territory and in relation to its natural
resources as if they were not their own, on one hand; and the duty not to deal in relation to East Timor
as if Portugal was not the de jure Administering Power, on the other hand.")
61. Teles, supra note 59, at 29.
62. East Thmor, supra note 1, para. 28.
63. Id. para. 34.
64. Id. para. 60 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting), pt. A, § l(iii)-(iv) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
65. Id. para. 43 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting).
66. Id. para. 47 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting).
67. Id. pt. A, § l(iv) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
68. Id. pt. A, § 2(v) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); see also id. pt. I (separate opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen).
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Weeramantry did not deny the importance of the consensual basis of
jurisdiction but asserted that "it is a matter of common sense that too rigid an
attraction to that principle will paralyze any international tribunal." 69 The
willingness of the dissenting judges to consider the issues in East Timor
presented in their wider context reflects an adherence to the U.N. Charter
model. Justice would undoubtedly have been better served by acknowledging
the significance of the principle of self-determination, and deciding the case
on its merits.
B. The Influence of Politics
The ICJ's emphasis on consent must be understood not only in
consideration of the traditional adherence to the fundamental concept of state
sovereignty, but also as a response to the political sensitivity of the case.
Eastern Carelia and Nicaragua70 both illustrate the ICJ's treatment of
political issues in disputes before the Court. The Court's distinction between
the legal and political aspects in these cases is indicative of its desire to
determine fairly the questions put before it. The fact that the Court was
prepared to draw this line demonstrates that the protection of state sovereignty
is not always a primary determining factor where a dispute involves political
as well as legal issues.7 1 In East Timor, however, the Court made a
distinction that implied a return to the Westphalian approach. The East Timor
decision can be considered a facet of a larger negotiation process undertaken
by Portugal, Indonesia, representatives of East Timor, and the United
Nations. Therefore, the Court's decision has ramifications in international
relations, not just in international law. There was, however, no explicit
acknowledgment of this fact in the Court's decision, which chose to focus
primarily on the Timor Gap Treaty.
In Eastern Carelia, Russia was not a member of the League of Nations
and refused to negotiate on the question of the status of Eastern Carelia
through the good offices of Estonia.7" Russia strongly protested Finland's act
of placing the issue before the League of Nations and considered the request
for an advisory opinion to be "an act of hostility to the Russian Federation
and an intervention in its domestic affairs."' Russia also criticized the
Permanent Court for being partial because some members of the Court
represented countries whose governments had not accorded de jure or, in
some cases, de facto recognition to the Soviet government.74 The Court's
refusal to exercise jurisdiction was therefore appropriate not only due to
Russia's lack of consent, but also because it avoided a potentially volatile
political situation.
69. Id. pt. A, § 2(v) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting) (citing ROSENNE, supra note 41, at 439).
70. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26) (Jurisdiction
and Admissibility).
71. See, e.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.CJ.
3 (May 24).
72. Advisory Opinion on the Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser B) No. 5, at 23-24 (July
23).
73. Id. at 13.
74. Id. at 13-14.
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Eastern Carelia was just one of many cases in which the Permanent Court
addressed jurisdictional problems, stating that in each of these cases the
"overriding emphasis" was judicial restraint.7' This point is well worth
noting considering the backlash against the ICJ following the decision on
preliminary questions in the Nicaragua case.7' Nicaragua instituted
proceedings against the United States on April 9, 1984, claiming that the
United States had breached international law through the use of force and
intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua in violation of the charters of
the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and of customary
international law. Nicaragua claimed in its application that the United States
was supporting the activities of guerrillas who were fighting to overthrow the
Nicaraguan government by training them and supplying them with financial
aid and military equipment. Nicaragua also asserted that the United States had
attacked it directly by mining its harbors and conducting armed raids on ports
and oil depots in Nicaraguan territory. The United States raised a number of
objections to the Court's jurisdiction, focusing on the operation of compulsory
jurisdiction and objecting to the admissibility of the dispute. These objections
mostly concerned the status and role of the Court in determining inherently
political, continuing disputes involving the use of armed force. The Court's
declaration that it had jurisdiction to hear the case was considered "an
unprecedented departure from the well-established legal principles governing
the ICJ's jurisdiction that had been nurtured over decades."'
The United States' principal reasons for withdrawing from the
proceedings were the Court's failure to recognize adequately the possible
abuse of the Court's procedures for political objectives and its departure from
the tradition of judicial restraint.78 The United States withdrew before the
ICJ gave a full hearing on the merits of the claims because it believed that its
consent to the adjudication of the dispute was at issue. The United States
criticized the proceedings brought by Nicaragua as a "blatant misuse of the
Court for political and propaganda purposes," 79 implying that the United
States' acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in such a case would
be an abuse of the Court's role.
The ICJ was able to deal with this dispute by separating its political from
its legal aspects.80 The Court relied on Corfu Channel8 ,to demonstrate its
ability to decide disputes that had political implications.8 2 Although the
75. See the analysis of the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court in Thomas J. Pax, Nicaragua v.
United States in the International Court of Justice: Compulsory Jurisdiction or Just Compulsion?, 8 B.C.
INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 471, 472 (1985).
76. See W. Michael Reisman, Has the International Court Exceeded its Jurisdiction?, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 128, 132 (1986) ("[T]he Court's creation of a valid Nicaraguan declaration is so ill-founded in
the facts, in the law, and in the Court's own jurisprudence as to constitute a ground of nullity.").
77. Pax, supra note 75, at 473.
78. U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the ICI,
DEP'T ST. BuLL., No. 2096, Mar. 1985, at 64 (statement of Jan. 18, 1985).
79. id.
80. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 434-35 (Nov. 26).
81. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
82. Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. at 435. This point was also affirmed in Teheran Hostages, where the
Court stated that "no provision of the [Court's] Statute or Rules contemplates that the Court should decline
to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that dispute has other aspects, however
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acknowledgment of political issues in a case could be construed as a move
away from traditional international law, the acknowledgment in Nicaragua can
still be criticized as a Westphalian approach. The creation of a line separating
politics and law whereby the Court deals only with those issues deemed to be
legal is more consistent with the Westphalian model than with the U.N.
Charter model. Decisions on the use of force and the right to self-defense
inevitably entail both legal and -political aspects, and it is thus extremely
difficult to distinguish between purely legal issues and purely political ones.
An approach more consonant with the U.N. Charter model would at least
acknowledge the difficulties in drawing such a line between law and politics
in international law.
The majority in East Timor, however, did not even reach the point of
drawing this line. Instead, it followed the Westphalian model and entirely
failed to acknowledge and consider the wider ramifications of its decision.
Australia argued in its countermemorial that a judgment of the Court that
Australia could not lawfully give effect to the Timor Gap Treaty with
Indonesia would inevitably impinge on Indonesia's right that Australia execute
its Treaty obligations.83 A judgment in Portugal's favor would expose
Australia to two binding but inconsistent obligations. In fact, Australia
contended that Indonesia would be advantaged by a decision that Australia
could not give effect to the Treaty as Indonesia would be "free to reassert its
view that it has exclusive rights to the greater part of the area."84
If the Court had looked at the entire situation before it, including the fact
that negotiations were continuing between Portugal, Indonesia, representatives
of East Timor, and the United Nations, it would have realized that a finding
on the legal positions of Portugal and Australia would have had implications
for the ongoing political processes. The Court could not have thought that it
could hand down a judgment with no impact on states other than Australia and
Portugal. The Court did not explicitly validate either Indonesia's invasion or
Australia's actions subsequent to that invasion.85 The decision in East Timor,
however, impacted Indonesia even without the Court ever having to proceed
to the merits of the case. Judge Skubiszewski wondered whether Indonesia,
as a third party, would benefit the most from the majority's decision;86 the
ICJ failed to condemn publicly Indonesia's military invasion and essentially
permitted Indonesia to continue treating East Timor as one of its provinces.
The Indonesian government has always maintained the position that the people
of East Timor had exercised their right of self-determination by choosing to
integrate with Indonesia. The ICJ was unanimous, however, in accepting that
East Timor was still a non-self-governing territory and that the East Timorese
still had the right of self-determination, implying that Indonesia's occupation
and control of Indonesia was illegal. This is clearly an underlying
important." United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 19
(May 24).
83. Counter-Memorial of Australia, supra note 5, 220.
84. Id. 268.
85. Gerry J. Simpson, Indispensable Sovereigns: Third and Fourth Parties in the inor Gap Treaty
Case at the World Court, in THE EAsT TIMoR CASE IN THE ICJ, supra note 59, at 75, 87.
86. East 2imnor, supra note 1, para. 48 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting).
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inconsistency in the ICJ's application of the Monetary Gold rule since it is
contrary to the Court's endeavor to prevent any finding on the international
responsibility of Indonesia. In this sense, the pronouncement on the status of
East Timor strengthens the position of the East Timorese in the political
negotiations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and may also
affect the way in which the wider international community conducts relations
with East Timor.
C. Scope of Consent
Although the necessary consent of a state may limit the ICJ's jurisdiction
to determine a dispute, the Court has wide jurisdiction over parties that have
given consent.87 For example, in many cases involving frontier disputes in
which the rights of a third state were potentially affected but did not form the
central subject matter of the dispute, the ICJ reached decisions by exercising
its jurisdiction to the fullest extent. One such case was Italian Intervention into
the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf Dispute where Italy sought to intervene
under article 62 of the Court's statute on the basis of a legal interest that was
"nothing less than respect for its sovereign rights over certain areas of
continental shelf in issue in the present case. " " Italy argued that the
delimitation of the areas of continental shelf in the central Mediterranean
would inevitably lead to a determination that certain areas did not appertain
to it, and Italy wished to ensure that the ICJ did not encroach on areas over
which it had rights.89 This argument required a finding on disputes between
Italy and either Libya or Malta or both.9" On that basis, Italy argued that the
Court could not settle such a dispute without the consent of either Libya or
Malta due to the "fundamental principle that the Court has no jurisdiction to
determine matters in dispute between states without their consent. "91 The ICJ
thus only decided between the competing claims of Libya and Malta92 and,
at the merits stage, refused to adjudicate on the delimitation of areas that also
implicated Italy's interests.93 The Court held that it could only exercise
jurisdiction to the extent that the parties had consented to the proceedings.
This position of the Court must be viewed as somewhat ironic, however, since
the refusal of Italy's application to intervene resulted in a narrowing of the
dispute to a purely bilateral arrangement specifically based on the consent of
Libya and Malta. 94
A chamber of the Court considered a similar issue in the Burkina
87. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 16
(Aug. 30).
88. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 3, 10 (Application to Intervene of Mar. 21).
89. Id. at 11-12.
90. Id. at 19.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id. at 27.
93. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 25 (June 3).
94. The Court's rejection of Italy's application to intervene and subsequent limiting of the case to
that part of the dispute that did not affect Italy's interests were considered "inappropriate if not irregular"
by Judge Schwebel in his dissenting opinion. CHRISTINE M. CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 203 (1993) (quoting Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. at 173 (Schwebel, J., dissenting)).
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Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute but produced a different outcome.95 The dispute
concerned determining the tripoint between Niger and the two disputant states.
Mali argued that the Court must refrain from reaching any decision on the
position of the tripoint because the rights of a third state not a party to the
proceedings, namely Niger, would be affected.96 Burkina Faso maintained
that the determination of the position of the tripoint was necessary as an
integral part of the task entrusted to the chamber and that there would be no
infringement of the rights of Niger as the determination of the point would be
a consequence, not the object, of the dispute.97 The chamber found that its
jurisdiction was not restricted just because there was a tripoint and the third
state was not represented.98 The chamber had the consent of Burkina Faso
and Mali and so decided to exercise its jurisdiction to its full extent.
A similar analysis could have applied in East Timor since the Court had
obtained the consent of Australia on the basis of compulsory jurisdiction. This
analysis would have involved an adoption of Portugal's argument that
Australia's acts could be separated from those of Indonesia,99 permitting the
ICJ to exercise jurisdiction. This argument was rejected by the majority,
which found instead that Indonesia's international responsibility was a
prerequisite to any decision on Australia's responsibility.'" An alternative
view of Australia's consent to the adjudication of the dispute could have
involved examining the genuine position of the disputant states prior to
deciding whether the consent of any other state or states was necessary for the
determination of the dispute. This was the path taken by the ICJ in Certain
Phosphate Lands in Nauru,'"' where the Court emphasized substance over
form. Nauru brought an action against Australia concerning the rehabilitation
of certain phosphate lands in Nauru worked out prior to Nauruan
independence. Nauru, which was previously administered under a League of
Nations mandate by Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, was
placed under the Trusteeship System by the United Nations General Assembly
in 1947. The joint administering authority under the mandate was replaced by
a trusteeship with "Australia continuing to exercise full powers of legislation,
administration and jurisdiction in and over the Territory." The exploitation of
the mines was entrusted to an enterprise managed by three British Phosphate
Commissioners appointed by the three governments. Nauru brought
proceedings against Australia on the basis of article 36(2), since both Nauru
and Australia had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court."02 The
95. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
96. Id. at 576.
97. Id.
98. In reaching this decision, the ICJ noted that Niger was not bound by the decision and that Niger
was not prevented from claiming rights to territories lying beyond the tripoint. Id. at 577-78.
99. East Timor, supra note 1, para 25.
100. Id. para. 28; see infra text accompanying notes 181-84.
101. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240 (June 26).
102. Nauru could not have brought its application against the United Kingdom under article 36(2)
due to a reservation in the United Kingdom's declaration that excludes from compulsory jurisdiction any
disputes with members of the British Commonwealth with regard to facts existing prior to 1969, which
was the case here. Nauru could have instituted proceedings against New Zealand, but this might have
emphasized the absence of the United Kingdom without avoiding the problem that not all three states were
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court. I.A. Shearer, Australia and the International Court of Justice,
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majority of the Court did not solely analyze the legal position of Australia
based on the various documents concerning the administration of the mandate
and trusteeship but instead considered the "true" role of Australia compared
with the roles of the other two administering authorities. This analysis is most
clearly evidenced in the separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, which
highlighted Australia's dominant role and stated that "Australia had exclusive
authority to administer Nauru for all practical purposes, as well as the even
more significant power to prevent any diminution or withdrawal of that
authority."" °3 Judge Shahabuddeen even took note of the fact that only the
Australian flag flew in Nauru up to the date of its independence. 1°4 By
looking beyond the formal documents, the majority of the Court found that
Australia alone had the governmental powers that could be exercised for the
purpose of legally ensuring rehabilitation of the phosphate lands. On this basis
it would seem that Australia's consent to jurisdiction did not restrict the Court
to the stark legal dimensions of the dispute.' Its consideration of the
greater dimensions extending from consent enabled the Court to find that New
Zealand and the United Kingdom were not necessary parties and that it
therefore had jurisdiction.
The Court's decision in East-Timor arguably followed this notion of
substance prevailing over form in order to comprehend fully the respective
positions of the disputants. This approach led, however, to the opposite
outcome. Indeed, in his separate opinion Judge Shahabuddeen made it clear
that Indonesia constituted a necessary party because of this emphasis. The
Court looked beyond Portugal's technical application to the effective demand
of a declaration of the invalidity of the Timor Gap Treaty, and moved beyond
the strict legal dimensions of the dispute. However, it was not prepared to go
so far as to analyze what the dissent claims is the broad basis of the argument,
namely, the status of East Timor and the operation of the right of self-
determination.0 6 When the position of the majority is thus compared with
that of the dissenting judges, it is evident that Judges Skubiszewski and
Weeramantry were prepared to consider the case in its entirety in the same
way as Judge Shahabuddeen did in Nauru. The majority in East Timor,
however, considered the position of the different parties only to the extent
required for the application of the Monetary Gold principle.
D. Conclusion
By a strict application of the Monetary Gold principle, the Court in East
Timor determined that it could not decide the case without ruling on the rights
and interests of Indonesia and that Indonesia's consent would have been
required for such an adjudication. In reaching this decision, the Court moved
67 AUSTL. L.J. 301, 302 (1993).
103. Nauru, supra note 101, at 278-79 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
104. Id. at 280 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
105. Id.; cf. id. at 301 (Jennings, J., dissenting), 337-40 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
106. East Thnor, supra note 1, paras. 45, 50 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting) ("The substance of the
case is broader and goes deeper than that Treaty."); see also id. pt. A, § 1(iii), pt. C (Weeramantry, J.,
dissenting).
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away from the expansionist U.N. Charter model approach developed in cases
such as Nauru and Nicaragua and reverted to a Westphalian approach. The
Court in East Timor had the opportunity to satisfy the justice of the case by
resting consent to jurisdiction on a broad basis to allow the ICJ to appreciate
the scope of the dispute and by deciding the case on the fundamental principle
of the right of self-determination. Unfortunately, it made no such advancement
and instead based its decision on the Timor Gap Treaty.
III. ARTICLE 59 AND NECESSARY PARTIES IN MULTILATERAL DISPUTES
The rights and interests of third parties in the settlement of disputes are
protected by more than the limitation imposed by the consensual jurisdiction
of the ICJ. Article 59 of the Court's statute provides: "The decision of the
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case." This article not only protects state sovereignty but also
enables the Court to maintain the purely bilateral character of disputes in
order to exercise jurisdiction. The limitation imposed by article 59 was a
prominent issue in East Timor. The people whom Portugal sought to represent
and whose right of self-determination formed a central issue to the dispute
could not constitute a party before the ICJ.' °7 Portugal thus brought an
action against Australia, a party to the bilateral treaty in issue. The reduction
of East Timor to a bilateral dispute between Portugal and Australia, however,
would have been inappropriate. This section argues that the Court's use of
article 59 to avoid findings of responsibility against absent states inadequately
protects third party rights given both the multilateral nature of modern
international relations and the influence that judicial decisions may have on
later adjudications.
A. Article 59 and Multilateral Disputes
The traditional approach to international law was that no joint interest in
compliance with law existed.' 8 The breach of a rule of law had to be settled
between the offending state and the victim state and was of no concern to
other states in the international community. With the development of
international relations and the concurrent growth of interdependence between
states, the "two party, zero-sum dispute" is now the "exception rather than
the rule."'" Despite this, the accepted theory of international adjudication
continues to assume that all disputes can be analyzed and settled in a bilateral
framework, thus emphasizing state sovereignty while neglecting the
"multifaceted interests characteristically at stake in international disputes."110
The ICJ's use of article 59 in Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru
illustrates the Court's reluctance to explore the wider, multilateral implications
of its decisions. In its preliminary objections in that case, Australia argued
107. STATUTE OF THlE ICJ art. 34(1) ("Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.").
108. CASSESE, supra note 28, at 397.
109. Lori F. Damrosch, Multilateral Disputes, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A
CROSSROADS 376 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987).
110. CHINKIN, supra note 94, at 148.
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that Nauru's claim was against the administering authority in relation to Nauru
rather than against Australia itself. Consequently, Australia argued, the Court
could not pass upon Australia's responsibility without adjudicating upon the
responsibility of New Zealand and the United Kingdom, states that had not
consented to the Court's jurisdiction in the case. 1 ' The ICJ relied on
Monetary Gold to hold that it was not precluded from adjudicating on the
matter unless the legal interests of the absent states formed the "very subject
matter" of the dispute. Where a state chose not to intervene, the Court held,
its interests would be protected by article 59. The Court found that the
interests of the United Kingdom and New Zealand did not form the central
subject matter of the dispute since the determination of their responsibility was
not a prerequisite for the determination of the responsibility of Australia, as
had been the case with Albania in Monetary Gold."' The Court did
acknowledge that a finding against Australia could have "implications for the
legal situation" of the other two states113 but chose to restrict what would
otherwise have been a multilateral dispute to the parties that were before the
Court." 4 While Judge Shahabuddeen specifically acknowledged that disputes
were more likely to be multilateral in nature, he argued that the Court's
approach endangered neither the principle of state sovereignty nor the
requirement of consent to adjudication." 5
Judge Ago criticized this aspect of the case in his dissenting opinion. He
argued that the legal rights and obligations of the United Kingdom and New
Zealand inevitably would be affected even if no actual finding on their legal
situation were necessary for the determination of Australia's
responsibility." 6 Judge Schwebel also dissented on this issue, stating that the
protection afforded the United Kingdom and New Zealand by article 59 was
"notional rather than real," 7 and recognizing the multilateral nature of the
dispute.
The potential operation of article 59 was not discussed by the majority in
East Timor, as the Monetary Gold principle of state sovereignty was held to
apply. Nonetheless, in his separate opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen
acknowledged that article 59 did not mean that the ICJ could determine a
dispute with "entire disregard of the implications of the decision for the legal
position of a non-party.""s Portugal, relying on its narrow interpretation of
Monetary Gold, argued that Indonesia would not be bound by the ICJ's
decision. Contrary to the Court's general approach to this provision, however,
the ICJ held that article 59 was not a "standing reservation" that allowed the
Court to pronounce as it liked on the legal interests of states not before the
11. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 259 (June 26).
112. Id. at 261.
113. Id. at 261-62. In Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 136 (June 7), the Court found that wider implications of a dispute did not
prevent adjudication when considering the obligations arising from the Treaty of Versailles.
114. An agreement was ultimately reached between Australia and the United Kingdom with regard
to the rehabilitation of Nauru. See infra text accompanying note 133.
115. Nauru, 1992 I.C.J. at 298 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
116. Id. at 328 (Ago, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 342 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
118. East 7mnor, supra note 1, pt. I (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
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Court.
The dissenting judges considered Indonesia to be merely "affected" by the
judgment and, in any event, protected by article 59.111 Judge Weeramantry
recognized both that there is a "network of interlocking international
relationships"" and that the interests of a third party state would be
inevitably affected by the Court's judgment. He stated that the East Timor
dispute did not, however, require an inquiry into all the military, diplomatic,
and political nuances of the situation, 2 ' and the fact that a nonparty state is
only "affected" would not bar the ICJ from exercising its jurisdiction.'2 His
equation of Australia with any other state that had entered into treaties with
Indonesia with respect to East Timor is not convincing if Portugal's
Application is viewed as relating solely to the negotiations and conclusion of
the Timor Gap Treaty. Since this treaty was directly at issue, Australia, as a
cosignatory, was specifically affected .by any decision that had an impact on
the validity of the treaty. The plausibility of the dissenting opinions derives
from their grounding in broader arguments concerning the right of self-
determination - a right that affects Australia and all members of the
international community.
B. Implications for Future Proceedings
Even if the interests of a state do not form the central subject matter of
a decision before the ICJ, the multilateral nature of the dispute may mean that
one of the parties before the Court may wish to bring proceedings against an
absent state at a future date. Unlike the cases of Nicaragua and Nauru, the
probability that Indonesia would accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ in a case
brought against it by Portugal is virtually nonexistent. The East Timor
decision may, however, influence future proceedings between different parties
where the issues at stake are similar to those in East Timor. Although article
59 originally may have been intended to prevent the common law rule of stare
decisis from applying to international adjudication," the ICJ must decide
disputes in accordance with international law.'24 This requirement has two
consequences. First, if the ICJ states in any judgment that a rule of
international law has been established by the necessary state practice and
opinio juris, this holding binds all states regardless of article 59, since it is
international law and must be respected in accordance with the Charter."z
119. Id. para. 59 (Skubiszewski J., dissenting), pt. A, § 2(iii) (Weeramantry J., dissenting).
120. Id. pt. A, § 3(iv) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
121. Id. pt. E(vi) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
122. Id. pt. A, § 2(iii) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
123. "[Tjhe debate in the committee ofjurists responsible for the Statute indicates clearly that Article
59 was not intended merely to express the principle of resjudicata but to rule out a system of binding
precedent." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 21 (4th ed. 1990).
124. STATUTE OF THE ICJ art. 38.
125. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.; Gerald P. McGinley, Intervention in the International Court: 7he
Libya/Malta Continental Shelf Case, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 671, 690-91 (1985). Judge Ranjeva in East
llmor also supported the notion that the function of the ICJ must include "not only the settlement of
disputes but also the scientific development of general international law." East Timor, supra note 1, pt.
I1.
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Second, the Court does defer to past decisions where rules of international law
have been articulated. Thus, an earlier judgment, although binding only on the
parties to the case at the time, may influence a later decision. 6
In Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Judge Shahabuddeen stated that a
judgment in favor of Nauru would not, per se, amount to a judicial
determination of the responsibilities of New Zealand and the United Kingdom
but rather would have "influential, not controlling, precedential value." 7
Any possible future adjudication among the parties was, however, affected by
the Court's decision on the preliminary questions in Nauru. Australia had
asserted even before the decision was handed down that if the Court found
against Australia, its government would seek contributions from the United
Kingdom and New Zealand for any payments of compensation.12 1 After the
Court rejected Australia's preliminary objections, the parties pursued
negotiations while the legal procedures for the merits stage of the case
proceeded. As a result of the negotiations between Australia and Nauru, a
settlement was reached prior to the oral pleadings. 9 Under this agreement,
Australia consented to make ex gratia payments to Nauru to "assist ...
Nauru in its preparations for its post-phosphate future. "130 In return, Nauru
waived its right to make any further claims regarding the administration or
termination of the mandate and trusteeship or relating to the phosphate
mining.13' This waiver also extended to any potential claims against the
United Kingdom and New Zealand.1 32 This release from claims by Nauru
resulted in an ex gratia contribution by the United Kingdom to the government
of Australia.'33
The ICJ considered similar possible effects of its decisions on later
proceedings involving absent states in Nicaragua. The United States argued
that the case was inadmissible since an adjudication of Nicaragua's claims
would necessarily implicate the rights and obligations of Honduras, Costa
Rica, and El Salvador with respect to collective self-defense, which would
require their express consent or participation in the proceedings before the
Court. 34 In response, the Court stated that it needed merely to rule on the
submissions in the proceedings before it. Its decision would be binding only
on the United States and Nicaragua, in accordance with article 59.135 The
126. McGinley, supra note 125, at 691.
127. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 297-98 (June 26)
(separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
128. Transcript of British Broadcasting Corporation Television Interview with Senator Gareth Evans,
Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, in London (Nov. 4, 1991), reprinted in 13 AUSTL.
Y.B. INT'L L. 412, 413 (1992).
129. Agreement for the Settlement of the Case in the International Court of Justice Concerning
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Aug. 10, 1993, Austl.-Nauru, 32 I.L.M. 1471 (entered into force Aug.
20, 1993).
130. Id. art. 1(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1474.
131. Id. art. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1475.
132. Id.
133. Exchange of Notes Regarding the Agreement Between Australia and the Republic of Nauru for
the Settlement of the Case in the International Court of Justice Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in
Nauru, Mar. 24, 1994, U.K.-Austl., 1994 Austl. T.S. No. 47.
134. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 430 (Nov. 26).
135. Id. at 431.
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ICJ rejected the United States' argument that a requirement of consent or
participation would "only be conceivable in parallel to a power, which the
Court does not possess, to direct that a third state may be made a party to the
proceedings. "136 The Court avoided the multilateral aspects of the dispute
by observing that all three states had made declarations of acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Thus, if their interests were affected,
separate proceedings could be instituted or the procedure of intervention could
be employed.'37 The Court's previous rejection of El Salvador's application
to intervene undercuts the credibility of this argument.' 3 El Salvador did
not seek to intervene again at the merits stage of the proceedings, and one can
only speculate as to whether or how the ICJ might then have dealt with the
multilateral nature of the dispute. It would hardly have seemed appropriate to
reject the application and suppose that the final decision on the facts and law
in Nicaragua would not affect a later dispute between El Salvador and
Nicaragua.
The impact of the decision on the merits in Nicaragua'39 was, however,
soon tested. 140 As part of Nicaragua's overall political campaign to discredit
support for the guerrillas, Nicaragua instituted simultaneous proceedings
against Costa Rica and Honduras one month after the merits judgment in
Nicaragua was delivered.' 4' Nicaragua alleged failures by the Costa Rican
government to prevent border and transborder attacks and incursions by
guerrillas operating out of its territory. Nicaragua argued that these failures
constituted a breach of Costa Rica's legal responsibility.1
41
The allegations directed at Honduras in Armed Actions 43 were more
extensive. Nicaragua argued that Honduras had incurred legal responsibility
for breaches similar to those alleged against the United States, namely,
breaches of the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of
American States and of customary international law regarding the threat or use
of force and intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua. Nicaragua
claimed that guerrillas based in Honduras were carrying out armed attacks on
Nicaraguan territory with the knowledge and assistance of the Honduran
government.
Honduras submitted that the Court had no jurisdiction over the matters
raised in Nicaragua's application and that the dispute was inadmissible since
the application was "a politically inspired, artificial request which the Court
should not entertain consistently with its judicial character."'" Honduras
136. Id.
137. Id.at425,431.
138. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 215 (Order of Oct. 4)
(rejecting declaration of intervention by El Salvador).
139. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (Merits).
140. Two New Cases Are Brought to the Court: Nicaragua Institutes Proceedings Against Costa Rica
and Against Honduras, I.C.J. Communiqu6, No. 86/10, July 29, 1986.
141. SHABTAi ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT 223 (4th ed. 1989).
142. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), I.C.J. Communique, No.
87/19, Aug. 12, 1987. Before Costa Rica filed its counter memorial, Nicaragua agreed to discontinue the
proceedings following the Guatemala City Peace Agreement.
143. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69 (Dec. 20)
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility).
144. Id. at 73.
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argued that Nicaragua's request was artificial, since certain facts had already
been at issue before the Court in Nicaragua and the distinct bilateral disputes
that Nicaragua claimed to exist there could not be separated from the general
conflict existing in Central America. 45
In response to this argument, the Court pointed to article 59, under which
it was not "possible to rely on considerations of resjudicata in another case
not involving the same parties."" 4 The facts would still have to be
established according to the usual rules of evidence by the parties before the
Court. In a separate opinion, Judge Schwebel criticized the Court's argument
as not "fully adequate." 47 In its memorial, Nicaragua had invoked the
findings of fact and the conclusions of law reached by the Court in Nicaragua.
These findings and conclusions were implicit findings against Honduras due
to the general nature of the dispute even though Honduras was not a party to
the case.14 To prevent Nicaragua from using the earlier decision to its full
advantage, which could well have deprived Honduras from pleading collective
self-defense as a major defense, Judge Schwebel believed it was "crucial" for
the Court to give "the most rigorous effect" to article 59. 149 The potential
effectiveness of article 59 was unfortunately never tested in these
circumstances, because Nicaragua discontinued the proceedings before the
case reached the merits stage. 50
C. Conclusion
The use of article 59 demonstrates that the Court has viewed international
disputes mainly in a bilateral context. Consequently, in true Westphalian
fashion, the ICJ has maintained emphasis on the need to protect the
sovereignty of states. Article 59 is meant to protect states that do not intervene
in proceedings." The very act of providing states with the means of
intervening, however, is an indication that a state's interests can be affected
and that article 59 cannot provide absolute protection of absent states' rights.
The Court's continued reliance on article 59 in order to avoid the reality of
the multilateral nature of disputes prevents the introduction of the U.N.
Charter model, and thus greater justice, into international relations. In the rare
event that a dispute is purely bilateral in nature, article 59 may have a logical
purpose. However, it is difficult for the Court to ignore that disputes are
increasingly multifaceted. It is unrealistic to expect article 59 to serve as a
blanket protection of third states' interests. This point was acknowledged to
some extent in East Timor through the application of the Monetary Gold
145. Id. at 91.
146. Id. at 92.
147. Id. at 128 (separate opinion of Judge Schwebel).
148. Id. at 130 (separate opinion of Judge Schwebel).
149. Id. at 131 (separate opinion of Judge Schwebel).
150. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 222 (Order of May 27).
151. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 431 (Nov.
26) (discussing nonbinding nature of Court decisions on third party states); Monetary Gold Removed from
Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K., U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19, 33 (June 15) ("Where ... the vital issue to be
settled concerns the international responsibility of a Third State, the Court cannot, without the consent of
that Third State, give a decision on that issue binding on any State.").
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principle to Indonesia. Nevertheless, the majority decision did not address the
rights and obligations of the East Timorese and the international community
in general. Any discussion of the duties of the international community with
regard to the status of East Timor, the right of the East Timorese to self-
determination, and the binding nature of the Security Council resolutions is
likely to affect future proceedings dealing with these issues. These questions,
however, were mostly left unresolved. If the Court does not take cognizance
of the multilateral nature of the cases before it, and if the Statute of the ICJ
remains unaltered, one may question whether adjudication, as opposed to
negotiation, mediation, or arbitration, is an appropriate method of settling
multilateral disputes.
The dispute concerning the status of East Timor and the rights of the East
Timorese is still far from resolved, and any satisfactory conclusion will be
reached only by negotiations between organs of the United Nations, the East
Timorese, Portugal, and Indonesia. Even if Indonesia did accept the
jurisdiction of the Court - an unlikely event - any case brought by Portugal
against it would still exclude the direct involvement of the relevant United
Nations bodies as well as, and more particularly, the East Timorese, since at
present, only states can be parties before the Court.' 2 Adjudication, which
necessarily involves the application of certain rules in the determination of a
winner and a loser, cannot easily meet the political and diplomatic challenges
that must be balanced for the resolution of a complex multilateral dispute. It
is also possible that any agreement reached on a political level may have more
force than a decision of the ICJ, which lacks an effective enforcement
mechanism. Adjudication might be more effective if jurisdiction were made
compulsory for all states party to the Court's statute and if joinder of parties
were allowed so that in a case such as East Timor, where it is alleged that two
contracting parties to a treaty have breached international law, both parties
can be brought before the Court. This would also allow actions to be brought
against states that have acted in concert and against a state that is complicitly
involved in a breach of law by another state. Such a change would better
reflect the current state of international relations.
IV. HOW THE INTERESTS OF STATES FORM THE 'VERY SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE DISPUTE'
When a state has not consented to the settlement of a dispute and its
interests are unable to be protected by the wording of article 59, the ICJ does
not have jurisdiction to decide cases where those interests also constitute the
very subject matter of the dispute. This section analyzes the reasons why a
state may be considered a necessary party so that its interests may gain such
a status in the view of the Court. Such interests may be a central issue
because, first, the absent state may have evidence that is crucial to the
determination of questions of fact by the Court; second, the determination of
international responsibility of another state may be an essential step prior to
the Court's finding against a party; third, the Court may decide to apportion
152. See infra Part V.
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fault so that if the respondent state is not entirely responsible for an
international wrong, blame is cast on an absent third state. Most commonly,
the respondent state will raise these points as preliminary issues, arguing that
the absence of the necessary party will greatly prejudice its defenses.
A. Provision of Evidence by a Necessary Party
The ICJ has not yet held that the possession of evidence by an absent
third state is a sufficient reason to deny jurisdiction. Under article 36 of the
Court's statute, the ICJ is empowered to determine "the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation."1"3 The Court has wide discretion in matters concerning
evidence. It is able to seek its own expert advice 54 and may direct questions
to agents, counsel, witnesses, and experts in oral proceedings. 55 Most
factual issues before the Court are resolved by pleadings and documentary
proof.15 6 As a result, the Court normally obtains adequate evidence to
determine the facts in question, 15 7 but occasionally difficulties may arise
when the parties before the Court do not have possession of certain facts that
are crucial to the presentation of their case.
The United States argued that at the jurisdictional phase of
Nicaragua,5 1 the dispute was inadmissible because Nicaragua had failed to
bring before the Court parties whose presence and participation were
necessary for their rights to be protected. El Salvador, Costa Rica, and
Honduras constituted "indispensable parties" not only because their rights and
obligations may have been implicated in the determination of the dispute, but
also because, as the United States contended, necessary facts relevant to the
conduct at issue were available only from the absent parties.
Nicaragua relied on the powers of the Court to obtain evidence under
article 44 of the Statute of the ICJ and under article 66 of the Rules of
Court.159 Nicaragua also argued that "it would be in the third states' interest
153. STATUTE OF THE ICJ art. 36(2)(c).
154. See id. art. 51.
155. Id.; Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Does. No. 4, at 93, 133-35 (art. 65).
156. Keith Highet, Evidence, the Court, and the Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1987).
157. Id. at 7; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 321-22
(June 27) (Merits) (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (outlining ICJ's considerable powers to obtain evidence under
articles 49 and 50 of its statute).
158. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26) (Jurisdiction
and Admissibility).
159. Article 44 of the Statute provides:
1. For the service of all notices upon persons other than the agents, counsel, and advocates,
the Court shall apply direct to the government of the State upon whose territory the notice has
to be served.
2. The same provision shall apply whenever steps are to be taken to procure evidence on the
spot.
Article 66 of the Rules provides:
The Court may at any time decide, eitherproprio mnotu or at the request of a party, to exercise
its functions with regard to the obtaining of evidence at a place or locality to which the case
relates, subject to such conditions as the Court may decide upon after ascertaining the views
of the parties. The necessary arrangements shall be made in accordance with Article 44 of the
Statute.
Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 4, at 93, 135.
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to provide the United States with factual material under [the third states']
control."' 60 This suggests that there was some evidence beyond the reach
of the United States and that to protect the interests of the third states -
interests that were not supposed to be the very subject matter of the dispute -
these states should have volunteered the information the Court needed.
16'
This argument, presented by Nicaragua, was hardly satisfactory. It did not
however, provoke any response from the Court, which instead relied on the
allocation of the burden of proof as the basis for the determination and
acceptance of the facts, 62 whereby a lack of factual evidence would result
in the rejection of a submission for being unproved rather than in a finding of
inadmissibility due to lack of evidence. 63
In East Timor, Australia requested that the ICJ find the dispute
inadmissible on the basis that the Court could not make reliable findings of
fact on issues central to the case.' 64 Australia argued that the Court required
information on the Consultation of 1976 through which the Popular Assembly
in Dili formally accepted integration into Indonesia, as well as geographic,
social, and political data relevant to the issue of self-determination in order to
decide on issues of sovereignty and self-determination. Australia asserted that
only Indonesia had this factual information and attempted to distinguish the
proceedings from Nicaragua, in which the Court addressed the problem of
evidence in the possession of absent parties through the allocation of the
burden of proof. 165 Despite provisions to the contrary in the ICJ's statute,
Australia again emphasized the Court's limited ability to acquire facts and
stressed its lack of authority to demand evidence from absent parties. 166 The
majority did not address this argument directly, but Judge Vereshchetin in his
separate opinion stated that evidence could have been provided by the
appropriate organs of the United Nations. Judge Weeramantry compiled a list
of salient facts based on admissions by Australia, relevant documents, and
general knowledge of the situation. 67 He thought that those facts were all
that was necessary for the Court to decide the case against Australia without
having to rule against Indonesia.' 65 Judge Weeramantry interpreted
Australia's argument to require the Court to rule on the legality of Indonesia's
invasion as a request to the Court to reexamine fully the facts and politics
160. Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. at 430.
161. Australia contended in Nauru that the absence of the United Kingdom and New Zealand would
deprive the Court of crucial factual information. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.),
1992 I.C.J. 240, 299 (June 26) (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen). However, Judge Shahabuddeen
considered that Australia would be in possession of all the relevant evidence from having in fact been in
charge of Nauru's administration at all relevant times and that the various procedures of the Court for
obtaining evidence could be utilized. Id. at 300 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
162. Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. at 437.
163. Id. So, for example, at the merits stage, the Court found as an established fact that the United
States gave financial aid to the guerrillas, but there was insufficient evidence to show that the United States
exercised such an overall degree of control to warrant a finding that the guerrillas acted on behalf of the
United States. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 61-62 (June 27)
(Merits).
164. Counter-Memorial of Australia, supra note 5, 301.
165. Id.
166. Id. 304.
167. East 7imor, supra note 1, pt. A, § l(ii) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
168. Id. pt. A, § 1(iii) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
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involved at the time of the invasion, and believed that the necessary materials
and information were already available to the Court through United Nations
organs. Apparently, Judge Weeramantry considered the illegality of
Indonesia's invasion to be a notorious fact 69 and thus believed that such a
ruling was not necessary, and that the Monetary Gold principle did not apply.
The lack of evidence on the actual wishes of the East Timorese caused
some concern to the Court. Judge Skubiszewski stated that, despite this
absence, the Court could still make certain elementary assumptions.17 ° Judge
Vereshchetin, in contrast, considered Portugal and Australia's failure to
consult with the East Timorese another reason that the Court lacked
jurisdiction.' This statement from his opinion is the only indication in the
ICI's jurisprudence that a lack of evidence might render a party necessary in
the adjudication of a dispute.
According to one commentator, Nicaragua was "founded upon an
intricate, shifting and controversial background of factual assertion."172 At
the merits stage of Nicaragua, the Court drew many inferences and made
factual assumptions about events concerning El Salvador, Costa Rica, and
Honduras in order to reach legal conclusions on the situation between
Nicaragua and the United States. 73 Judge Oda appraised the Court's finding
on the facts by saying that it was "beyond any doubt that the picture of the
present dispute painted by the Court is far from reality." 74 If the Court in
a case like Nicaragua would not accept the argument that a state is a
necessary party because of its possession of facts, it seems unlikely, even
despite Judge Vereshchetin's efforts in East Timor, that this argument would
stand on its own as a basis for the ICJ to refuse to exercise jurisdiction. The
Court's approach to evidence has been more consistent with the U.N. Charter
model than the Westphalian model. By relying on its own resources and
processes, the Court arguably sought a satisfactory resolution of the
proceedings without being constricted by technical arguments fundamentally
based upon state sovereignty. The decision in Nicaragua may be seen as a
violation of necessary judicial restraint - indeed, one may even consider it
an encroachment on the sovereignty of all states involved in the
proceedings - but it is also illustrative of the trend in the Court to "introduce
greater justice into international relations."" s
169. Judge Skubiszewski was willing to take account of facts concerning Indonesia's invasion on the
basis that it was public knowledge. Id. para. 88 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting).
170. "IT]he interests of the [East Timorese] are enhanced when recourse is made to peaceful
mechanisms, not to military intervention; when there is free choice, not incorporation into another State
brought about essentially by the use of force; [and] when the active participation of the people is
guaranteed .... ." Id. para. 52 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (separate opinion of Judge Vereshchetin).
172. Highet, supra note 156, at 2.
173. Damrosch, supra note 109, at 392 n.76.
174. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 243 (June 27) (Merits)
(Oda, J., dissenting); see also Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69,
131-32 (Dec. 20) (separate opinion of Judge Schwebel).
175. CAssEsE, supra note 28, at 399.
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B. Prior Determination of Responsibility
A respondent state may claim that another state is a necessary party to a
case because it believes that state is also culpable for the alleged breach of
international law. This was a central issue in Monetary Gold, where the ICJ
found that Albania's interests formed the central subject matter of the dispute
because the Court had to consider whether Albania was responsible for an
international wrong before it could consider the competing interests of Italy
and the United Kingdom. The general rule developed in Nauru and East
Timor stresses the importance of the timing of the determination of
responsibility. In this recent interpretation of the Monetary Gold principle,
which requires a prior finding of international responsibility of an absent state,
the temporal distinction has overshadowed the individual responsibility of the
respondent state before the Court.
In Nauru, the ICJ found that it was not a prerequisite to determine the
responsibility of either New Zealand or the United Kingdom in order to
determine Australia's responsibility.' 76 If it had been a prerequisite, the
situation would have been analogous to that in Monetary Gold. Australia
argued in Nauru, however, that there would be a simultaneous determination
of the responsibility of all three states based on the legal equality in the
trusteeship system and that such a situation would be "equally precluded by
the fundamental reasons underlying the Monetary Gold decision." 17 The
Court rejected Australia's argument in Nauru and held that the distinction was
not only temporal but also logical, 7 ' and it would not decline jurisdiction
just because it was more convenient to make a decision with all the potentially
affected parties present. A court would have to find that an absent state was
central to the dispute to make it judicially impossible for the Court to
adjudicate it. 79 Judge Schwebel disagreed with the temporal issue since he
did not believe that the timing of the finding of responsibility was significant.
The important factor is "whether the determination of the legal rights of the
present party effectively determines the legal rights of the absent party,"
regardless of any temporal prerequisites. 8 0
In its countermemorial in East Timor, Australia tackled the temporal
qualification to the Monetary Gold principle the Court imposed in Nauru.
Australia's argument that Indonesia's rights and obligations formed the central
subject matter of the dispute also addressed the temporal issue insofar as its
alleged violations were contingent on Indonesia's own wrongs.'"' The
fundamental issue for Australia was "whether, in 1989, the power to conclude
a treaty on behalf of East Timor in relation to its continental shelf lay with
Portugal or Indonesia."'5 2 Whether the East Timorese had been denied their
right of self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural resources
176. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 l.C.J. 240, 261 (June 26).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 293 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
180. Id. at 331 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
181. Counter-Memorial of Australia, supra note 5, 191, 194.
182. East 71mor, supra note 1, para. 27.
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and whether Australia had violated its obligations to respect Portugal's status
as administering power and East Timor's status as a non-self-governing
territory depended on whether Indonesia had sovereignty over East
Timor. 3 The Court's first step was to determine whether Indonesia had the
legal capacity to enter into the treaty based on its purported sovereignty. The
result of this deliberation would have then determined whether Australia had
breached international law by negotiating and concluding the treaty with
Indonesia. This initial decision on Indonesia's international responsibility made
Indonesia's position analogous to that of Albania's in Monetary Gold. The
ICJ's interpretation of Monetary Gold has since been criticized by Portugal,
which has emphasized that the binding nature of the obligation is the critical
issue and any temporal distinction is irrelevant.184
Judge Ranjeva stated in his separate opinion that he thought the crux of
the case lay in the determination of whether a prior adjudication of the
lawfulness of Indonesia's presence in East Timor was required, and this
decision involved a consideration of objective and subjective rights.'
85
Subjective rights are those "rights relating to the legal situation of a state
which has not consented to the jurisdiction or which does not appear before
the Court" whereas objective rights are those opposable erga omnes.8 6 This
distinction is based on Judge Ranjeva's interpretation of Monetary Gold where
the "determining proposition turned upon a question of personal subjective
rights governing mutual relations between two legal entities, whereas the
principal question turned upon a true objective point of law: the attribution of
gold."187 In applying this reasoning to East Timor, Judge Ranjeva found that
the Court was not obliged to rule on Indonesia's actions as a prerequisite to
the adjudication of the dispute between Portugal and Australia.' s Instead,
Portugal's objective of requiring the "nullification" of the Timor Gap Treaty,
thereby depriving Indonesia of the performance of this treaty, called for a
direct determination of subjective rights."89 In Judge Ranjeva's view, it was
impossible for the ICJ to resolve the question of subjective rights without the
consent of Indonesia. 90 The objective right in the case was the East
Timorese's right to self-determination, opposable erga omnes to Australia's
action. 9' Judge Ranjeva believed, however, that the Court could have
adjudicated this right without the requirement of a prior decision. The
emphasis that he placed on the Monetary Gold rule appears to be on the types
of interests and rights involved. His distinction between objective and
subjective rights avoids the arbitrariness of a temporal adjudication of
responsibility and also allows for the application of erga omnes rights and
duties without hiding behind the rule of consent to jurisdiction.
183. See id. para. 33.
184. Teles, supra note 59, at 29-34.
185. East imor, supra note 1, pt. I (separate opinion of Judge Ranjeva).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. pt. II (separate opinion of Judge Ranjeva).
189. Id.
190. Id. pt. I (separate opinion of Judge Ranjeva).
191. Id. pt. II (separate opinion of Judge Ranjeva).
1996]
334 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 305
In his dissent, Judge Weeramantry was very critical of the majority's
interpretation of the Monetary Gold principle whereby the international
responsibility of a third state must be established as a prerequisite to the claim
or defense. Fundamentally, this would mean that,
where a claim by state A against state B cannot be made good without demonstrating as a
prerequisite, some wrongful conduct on the part of state C, state B can avoid an inquiry into
its own conduct, however wrongful, by pointing to C's wrongdoing as a precondition to its
own liability.1"2
This is an enlightening perspective on the Monetary Gold principle. The focus
in the cases is generally on the plight of the reluctant respondent state that is
dragged before the Court for an adjudication of its international responsibility
when another state may be equally culpable for the conduct in question.'93
Judge Weeramantry's opinion appropriately switches the emphasis back to the
wrongful conduct of the respondent state.'94  Even if Australia's
responsibility derived from Indonesia's conduct, Australia could not, and
should not, avoid its own responsibility by pointing to Indonesia's primary
responsibility. 95 This reasoning is analogous to that expressed in Judge
Shahabuddeen's separate opinion in Nauru: "[T]hat others had the same
obligation does not lessen the fact that Australia had the obligation. It is only
with Australia's obligation that the Court is concerned." 96 The success of
this argument depends on how easily the actions of one state can be separated
from those of another state. Such an approach is preferable, and ascertains a
state's individual responsibility rather than drawing a temporal distinction.
Another point to be drawn from Nauru that could have been relevant in
East Timor is that simultaneous responsibility is not enough to invoke the
operation of the Monetary Gold principle. The ICJ could have rejected
Australia's pedantic reasoning that essentially drew a distinction between
direct and indirect responsibility. Judge Weeramantry took this position in his
dissent and emphasized the importance of individual responsibility in a
multilateral international community. The entire Court accepted Portugal's
submission that the right of peoples to self-determination was a right erga
omnes; this assertion was "irreproachable."197 On this basis, the Court could
have reasoned that if Indonesia breached this erga omnes obligation by
negotiating and concluding the Timor Gap Treaty, then Australia
192. Id. pt. A, § 2(vi) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
193. In Nauru, for example, Australia emphasized the shared responsibility of New Zealand and the
United Kingdom as members of the administering authority, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru
v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 255 (June 26), and thus brought attention to the alleged injustice of Australia's
being sued alone.
194. "One of the principles most deeply rooted in the doctrine of international law and most strongly
upheld by state practice and judicial decisions is the principle that any conduct of a state which
international law classifies as a wrongful act entails the responsibility of that state in international law."
Roberto Ago, [1971] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N pt. 1, at 205, para. 30, quoted in East Thnor, supra note
1, pt. A, § 3(ii) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
195. East timor, supra note 1, pt. A, § 3(ii) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
196. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 296-97 (June 26)
(separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen), quoted in East Tiuor, supra note 1, para. 92 (Skubiszewski,
J., dissenting).
197. East Tinor, supra note 1, para. 29.
Necessary Parties in the East Timor Case
simultaneously breached this obligation as the other contracting party to the
bilateral Treaty. The Court could have therefore concluded that the Monetary
Gold principle did not apply, and exercised jurisdiction in the case. The ICJ's
refusal to find a simultaneous breach of an erga omnes obligation lessened the
impact of its affirmation of the right of the East Timorese to self-
determination.
The concept of simultaneous responsibility can also explain the anomalous
position of Corfu Channel,98 which the Court decided prior to Monetary
Gold. One of the arguments raised by the United Kingdom in Corfu Channel
was that the minefield that had damaged the British ships was laid with the
connivance of the Albanian government, implying Albania's collusion with the
Yugoslav government.199 Albania in turn asserted that the minefield may
have been laid by the Greek government.2' In view of these accusations of
international responsibility, it was apparent that the issue of necessary parties
was before the Court. The case, however, did not ultimately decide this issue
since the Court ascribed responsibility to Albania based upon Albania's
knowledge of the presence of the minefield and its failure to warn the United
Kingdom. Judge Weeramantry referred to Corfu Channel in East Timor,
noting that:
Had the Court accepted the United Kingdom's submissions, it would have been making a
clear finding of the commission of an illegality by Yugoslavia. The fact that such a wrongful
act was alleged against a third party did not deter the Court from considering the alternative
argument placed before it.2 '
Judge Weeramantry considered Corfu Channel to be a "stronger instance of
third-party involvement" than East Timor.2 2  One commentator has
suggested that since the ICJ considered the facts to be investigated in
Monetary Gold beyond its jurisdiction in contrast to its more flexible approach
in Corfu Channel, Monetary Gold should be regarded as a unique case. 3
Judge Shahabuddeen in his separate opinion in East Timor sought to
rationalize the Corfu Channel decision by saying that there was no finding of
international responsibility against Yugoslavia since Albania, through its
acquiescence, had made Yugoslavia's act its own.2" An alternative
explanation is that any finding of collusion between the governments would
be consistent with a finding of simultaneous responsibility. Therefore,
following the reasoning of the ICJ in Nauru, the Court would still be able to
exercise its jurisdiction to decide the case in. accordance with the Monetary
Gold principle.
198. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
199. Id. at 16-17.
200. Id. at 17. The Court dismissed this argument as mere conjecture.
201. East Tinor, supra note 1, pt. A, § 2(vii)(b) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
202. Id.
203. Christine Chinkin, Rights But No Remedies - Legal Implication of the East 77mor Decision,
in THE EAT TIMOR CASE IN THE ICJ, supra note 59, at 93, 107 [hereinafter Chinkin, Rights But No
Remedies].
204. East 2hnor, supra note 1, pt. I (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
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C. Apportionment of Responsibility
An absent state may also be necessary in proceedings if it is partially
responsible for the alleged international wrong. This situation arose in East
Timor, as Australia was being sued by Portugal for negotiating and concluding
the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia. Thus, any alleged breach of
international law by Australia in concluding the Timor Gap Treaty clearly
would also have been committed by Indonesia as cosignatory to the treaty. In
framing its argument, Australia relied on the decision of the ICJ in Nauru.
Australia argued in Nauru that determination of its joint or joint and several
liability with New Zealand and the United Kingdom would necessarily involve
adjudicating the responsibility of New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The
Nauru Court found whether Australia could be sued alone and whether there
was joint or joint and several liability to be two independent issues. °" Judge
Shahabuddeen accepted the majority's opinion on this point with respect to
joint liability. He determined, however, that on the assumption of Australia's
responsibility for an international wrong, the appropriate standard of liability
would be joint and several liability; accordingly, Australia could be sued
alone.2"a
Australia briefly considered the severability issue in East Timor. On the
basis of the majority's separation of the two issues in Nauru, Australia argued
in its countermemorial that "[i]f Portugal's action is sustainable, this action
constituted identical violations by both [Indonesia and Australia] of identical
obligations resulting in identical damage."2 °" Australia sought to establish
that no separation was possible because Indonesia was condemned on either
a finding of joint liability or of joint and several liability. Thus, the judges
could have distinguished Nauru from East Timor on the facts, but all of the
judges focused on prior determination of responsibility and did not address
this point. If the Court had considered the issue, the ICJ should have chosen
to follow the approach of Judge Ago in Nauru. Judge Ago, in his dissent,
stated that a finding of either Australia's full or its partial responsibility would
affect the legal rights and obligations of New Zealand and the United
Kingdom.2"8 Apportioning fault expressly to the respondent state before the
Court implicitly apportions fault against certain nonparties. Any express
apportionment of responsibility to Australia in East Timor would have
undeniably constituted a finding of fault against Indonesia due to their
respective positions under the Timor Gap Treaty. Such a determination of
responsibility would manifestly contradict the Monetary Gold principle and
would have undoubtedly produced political ramifications for the reciprocal
rights and obligations created under the treaty in the exploitation of the Timor
Gap. Despite Indonesia's absence before the Court, it too would be found to
be breaching international law by adhering to the terms of the treaty.
205. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 258-59 (June 26).
206. Id. at 285 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
207. Counter-Memorial of Australia, supra note 5, 228.
208. Nauru, 1992 I.C.J. at 328 (Ago, J., dissenting).
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D. Determination of Responsibility at the Merits Stage
Some commentators argue that the Court cannot always satisfactorily
resolve whether an absent state should be a necessary party at a preliminary
stage.2 9 For example, the Court could leave the issue of whether a state is
necessary to provide crucial factual information until the merits stage when
the Court has a clearer view of what evidence it needs to make a reasoned
decision.21 The merits stage of the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf Dispute,
after the ICJ had refused Italy's application to intervene, serves as an
example. Only at the merits stage, when the Court was fully aware of the
implications of Italy's exclusion from the proceedings, did it find that it could
not adjudicate the dispute in view of Italy's claims over certain areas.2 '
Similarly, in Nicaragua, the Court reached legal conclusions based on factual
assumptions about events in and affecting states not present before the
Court.2" This reflected the multilateral nature of the dispute and emphasized
the importance of having other states before the Court. Only after the full
presentation of the case did the need to protect those states' interests become
apparent.
213
In East Timor, the ICJ had the advantage of hearing the jurisdictional
issues and the merits of the case together. Australia employed this tactic
because "it was appreciated that the natural interest and sympathy of theCourt
for the East Timorese people and their undoubted right of self-determination
might have operated to inhibit the Court from accepting Australia's
preliminary objections to competence."214 The Court may have been more
209. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 109, at 394; McGinley, supra note 125, at 692.
210. Damrosch, supra note 109, at 394.
211. CHINKIN, supra note 94, at 202-03.
212. Damrosch, supra note 109, at 392 n.76.
213. Another aspect of Nicaragua that resulted in a modicum of protection for third states' rights
concerned a jurisdictional argument raised by the United States on whether its declaration accepting
compulsory jurisdiction constituted the necessary consent to the jurisdiction of the Court, particularly in
view of its multilateral treaty reservation. This reservation applied to "disputes arising under a multilateral
treaty, unless.., all the parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before
the Court" and was meant to protect the United States and third states from any prejudicial effects of
partial adjudication of multiparty disputes. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392, 421-22 (Nov. 26) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility). The United States argued that Honduras,
Costa Rica, and El Salvador would all be "affected" in a legal and practical sense by adjudication of the
claims submitted to the Court. Id.
The ICJ considered this a substantive question and, as such, the issue did not possess an exclusively
preliminary character. Id. at 425. At the merits stage, the Court found that El Salvador would be affected
by the judgment. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 38 (June 27)
(Merits). Although this decision meant that the ICJ had to apply the multilateral treaty reservation, it still
could determine if customary international law had been breached. Id. This result indicates that
circumstances do exist wherein the potentially affected interests of a third state may have an impact on the
Court's ability to decide a case. SHABTAI ROSENNE, INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 163 (1993). This decision, however, hardly has far-reaching implications for the protection of
third states given that out of the small number of states that have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court, an even smaller number have included the multilateral treaty reservation, and not all multiparty
disputes are treaty-based. See Leo Gross, Compulsory Jurisdiction Under the Optional Clause: History and
Practice, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 109, at 19, 25 tbl.
2 (listing states that have included multilateral treaty reservation).
214. Gavan Griffith, Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia): An Overview, in THE
EAST TIMOR CASE IN THE ICJ, supra note 59. Australia adopted this strategy out of a belief that the
"natural curiosity of the Court to look at the merits of what was an extraordinary and unusual claim in the
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willing to accept Australia's argument that Indonesia constituted a necessary
party because the arguments on the merits consolidated the significance of
Indonesia's absence from the proceedings. If so, the East Timor decision
emphasizes that the ICJ should have reserved a determination of a potential
necessary party's responsibility until the merits stage.
Problems may also arise when a respondent state attempts to establish at
a preliminary stage that a third state's presence before the Court is necessary
to apportion fault properly. Unlike the majority in Nauru, Judge
Shahabuddeen decided to consider the issue of joint and joint and several
liability at the jurisdictional stage of the case, and in doing so worked under
the assumption that Australia was indeed responsible for the rehabilitation of
the phosphate mines.215 Thus, he seemed to be deciding on a final aspect of
the case at a preliminary stage.
Then-President of the Court Sir Robert Jennings' view on this issue also
related to a final aspect of the case. He stated that New Zealand's and the
United Kingdom's "inextricable involvement" in the trusteeship meant that by
addressing reparations, the Court would unavoidably influence their
interests.2 6 Vice President Oda, on the other hand, considered the necessary
parties argument to be too closely connected with the merits for decision in
the preliminary objections and believed that it would be "premature to close
the door on the objection concerned."27 Since Nauru did not reach the
merits stage, one can only conjecture whether Vice President Oda adopted this
view in recognition of the multilateral nature of the dispute.
E. Conclusion
The analyses of Nauru and East Timor suggest that the Court will only
consider states as necessary parties in proceedings in which the finding of
international responsibility of a third state is a prerequisite to a determination
of responsibility of the parties before the Court. This reasoning supports the
Westphalian model by emphasizing the independent existence of states, but
neglects the importance of individual state responsibility - an issue
highlighted by Judge Weeramantry in East Timor. The demand that the
proceedings be virtually analogous to Monetary Gold for the Monetary Gold
principle to apply is exigent since the facts of that case were unique. Indeed,
some have described it as a case of "exceptional singularity. "218 The other
reasons why a state may be a necessary party have not greatly impacted the
preliminary stages of disputes. By reserving a decision to the merits stage, the
ICJ is more likely to realize and account for whether the interests of an absent
state form the very subject matter of the dispute. Such a development would
Nauru Case might be suggested as a motivation for the Court to qualify the necessary parties [sic]
principles in the preliminary objection stage." Id.
215. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 285-90 (June 26)
(separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
216. Id. at 301 (Jennings, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 303 (Oda, J., dissenting).
218. Aerial Incident of3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1989 I.C.J. 132, 140 (Order of Dec. 13) (separate
opinion of Judge Schwebel); see also ROSENNE, supra note 41, at 431 (discussing unique facts of Monetary
Gold).
1996] Necessary Parties in the East Timor Case
allow the Court to reach resolutions of the dispute that would more
satisfactorily address the potential complications involving the determination
of international responsibility.
V. NONSTATES AS NECESSARY PARTIES
The development of international law - from focusing on the traditional
notion of separate state entities to emphasizing global interdependence - has
produced a concomitant growth of new subjects in the international arena.
This part examines the ICJ's dealings with these new subjects when they have
potentially been necessary parties. Traditionally, states were the sole subjects
of international law. When the Statute of the Permanent Court was first
drafted, article 34 clearly stated: "Only States can be parties before the
Court." 21 9 States were not prepared to limit their sovereignty by granting
other entities jurisdiction to bring proceedings against them in an international
forum. However, East Timor illustrates that organized peoples may be among
the new subjects of international law."z
Issues surrounding nonstates are the subject of increasing debate at the
international level. As nonstates continue to develop into recognized subjects
of international law, it becomes increasingly important to ensure that the
structures of the international order afford adequate protection to their rights
and interests. Furthermore, these new subjects of international law could
constitute necessary parties to a dispute before the ICJ. The ICJ may soon
be confronted with a factual scenario in which the international responsibility
of a nonstate must be determined as a prerequisite to a determination of the
219. "Can" was changed to "may" in the Statute of the ICJ. See Shabtai Rosenne, Reflections on
the Position of the Individual in Inter-State Litigation in the International Court of Justice, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 240, 244 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1967)
[hereinafter Rosenne, Reflections].
220. The jurisprudence of the ICJ has not always focused solely on states as subjects. See, e.g.,
Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6); Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A.
83 (1956); Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 25); Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22) (dealing with international wrongs suffered by
state national that may be taken up by thatstate under banner of diplomatic protection). In its advisory
opinions, the ICJ has more readily protected the rights of individuals. See, e.g., Judgments of the
Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made Against the UNESCO, 1956 I.C.J. 77 (Oct.
23) (requiring hearing of views and arguments of four individual officials to ensure good administration
ofjustice). Also, since Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174 (Apr. 11), where the United Nations sought an advisory opinion on whether it had standing against
Israel in the murder of a U.N. mediator, the ICJ has recognized that international organizations have
international personality and may make claims. In Nomination of the Netherlands Workers' Delegate to
the Third Session of the International Labor Conference, the Permanent Court allowed the participation
of any international organization that wished to be heard. Advisory Opinion No. 1, Nomination of the
Netherlands Workers' Delegate to the Third Session of the International Labor Conference, 1922-1926
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 1, at 9 (July 31, 1922). The Permanent Court's successor, the ICJ, however, has
not been as flexible in its approach in calling for and accepting submissions from international
organizations. CHINKIN, supra note 94, at 229-30, 230 n.20.
221. See IAN BRowNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-67 (4th ed. 1990)
(discussing status of various categories of nonstates under international law); Ian Brownlie, The Individual
in Tribunals Exercising International Jurisdiction, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 701 (1962) (advocating that
individuals be considered subjects of international law in spite of procedural difficulties); Rosenne,
Reflections, supra note 219, 247-50 (arguing that ICJ should develop procedures to allow individuals to
appear before Court).
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international responsibility of a state. The fundamental notion of consent
encapsulated in the Westphalian model could come into play here; it is just as
legitimate not to assess a nonstate's responsibility for a breach of international
law in its absence as it is to assess that of a state. To extend the principle of
adjudicative consent to nonstate actors in this way would move toward the
U.N. Charter model. Such a development is certainly warranted when
principles such as the right of self-determination are at issue, as this right
necessarily affects international subjects other than states. Thus, in East
Timor, Indonesia was not the only international subject to be affected by the
ICJ's ruling on Portugal's arguments regarding the right of self-determination
and permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The East Timorese, as a
group of organized peoples, were intrinsically affected by the decision as well.
This part will consider the roles that organized peoples may have before the
Court. This analysis will encompass the current contribution of the entities
and assess why they may constitute necessary parties. In light of the various
opinions in East Timor, particular attention will be paid to the impact of erga
omnes rights on the position of organized peoples in disputes before the ICJ.
A. Organized Peoples
Cassese has defined organized peoples as national liberation
movements - peoples under colonial, alien, or racist dominations endowed
with a representative organization.222 These movements are usually
characterized by the group's controlling or striving to control some part of a
territory, aspiring to possess effective control over a population living in a
given area, and having international legitimation based on the principle of self-
determination.' The fact that organized peoples' international legitimation
stems from the principle of self-determination distinguishes them from
insurgents whose legitimation is derived from control of territory.224
Cassese's definition appears to support claims to self-determination of
organized peoples who are not solely within existing colonial boundaries.
However, he has not expressly taken this position, and the right of self-
determination across existing colonial borders remains controversial in
international law.' This was not, however, a perplexing issue in East
Timor, as the East Timorese clearly fall into the traditional category of those
peoples entitled to exercise a right of self-determination as part of the
decolonization process.
Organized peoples may try to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court on the
ground that they constitute a nation. Such a claim was made by the Aboriginal
Legal Service in Australia, which appealed to the ICJ for advice on the legal
status of Aborigines and on the ownership of Australia. 6 Claims that are
222. CASSESE, supra note 28, at 90-91.
223. Id. at 91.
224. Id. at 98.
225. See the discussion on this issue in Deborah Z. Cass, Re-thinking Self-Determination:A Critical
Analysis of Current International Law Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 21 (1992).
226. J.G.S., Access of Individuals to the International Court of Justice, 52 AUSTL. L.J. 523, 523
(1978).
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based on the organized people's constituting a nation are not usually adequate
to invoke the Court's jurisdiction. 7 A request for an advisory opinion may
be framed to enable the Court to pronounce upon the rights of the organized
peoples." For example, in Western Sahara, the Court was asked to give
an opinion on whether Western Sahara was terra nullius at the time of its
colonization and if not, what legal ties existed between it and Morocco and
Mauritania. 9 The Court decided that Western Sahara was not terra
nullius and that neither Morocco nor Mauritania had exercised territorial
sovereignty over the area at the time of colonization." This opinion
effectively reaffirmed a resolution passed by the General Assembly that the
people of Western Sahara had the right of self-determination. 2 The rights
of organized peoples may arise in contentious proceedings, although East
Timor is the only case that has come before the ICJ in which the rights of an
organized people have been inextricably linked to the central issues of the
case. In East Timor, Portugal claimed that Australia owed an obligation "to
observe the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and the
related rights (including the right to territorial integrity and unity and to
permanent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources)" and "to
negotiate with the competent State," namely Portugal, on maritime areas near
East Timor. 3 Australia contended that Portugal did not have a right to
bring an action on behalf of the people of East Timor on the basis of the right
of the East Timorese to self-determination. 4 If the derivation could not be
established, it was argued, the claim was inadmissible.
The right of self-determination is clearly established as a principle of
international law. It is included in article 2 of the United Nations Charter and
is also stated in article 2 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples." The ICJ accepted that this had
crystallized into a norm of international law both in its advisory opinion on
Namibia in 1971"' and in its advisory opinion on the Western Sahara in
1975." State practice is demonstrated by the millions of people who have
227. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights and Duties of States provides
that the four criteria are: (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) a government, and (d)
a capacity to enter into relations with other States. Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights and
Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100.
228. J.G.S., Access of Individuals, supra note 226, at 524.
229. G.A. Res. 3292, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2318th plen. mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. A1RESI3292
(1974).
230. western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 37-40 (Oct. 16).
231. Id. at 67.
232. In Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21), the Court also affirmed that the people of Namibia had the right
of self-determination.
233. Counter-Memorial of Australia, supra note 5, 233.
234. Id. 258-63.
235. "All peoples have the right of self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." G.A. Res. 1514,
U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, 947th plen. mtg. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (1960); see also
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 5.
Australia and Portugal are parties to these covenants, but Indonesia is not.
236. See Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 31.
237. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-32 (Oct. 16).
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been liberated from colonial rule under the banner of self-determination.
When the Court considered the issue of self-determination in Namibia, it
found that "the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-
self-governing territories as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations
made the principle of self-determination applicable to all nations." 8 In East
Timor, the Court described it as "one of the essential principles of
contemporary international law." 9 Therefore, the issue that the ICJ had to
address in East Timor was not the existence of this principle but rather the
duties of third parties toward peoples claiming the right of self-determination.
Judge Vereshchetin considered the right of the East Timorese to self-
determination to be at the core of the proceedings.240 Therefore, the Court
should have dealt with Portugal's repeated assertions that "the main interest
in bringing the present proceedings belongs to the people of East Timor." 241
He recognized that the East Timorese could not receive the same procedural
treatment as Portugal or Australia due to the operation of article 34 of the
Court's statute,242 but that did not mean that their wishes should not be
ascertained and taken into account by the Court.243 This was the minimum
level of involvement of the East Timorese acceptable to Judge Vereshchetin.
The East Timorese were considered to be "directly concerned" in the
negotiations and consultations being conducted by the United Nations.244
This should have indicated the importance of ascertaining the views of the
East Timorese through their representatives.24 5 Judge Vereshchetin criticized
both Australia and Portugal for their failure to present this aspect of the case.
He thus distinctly recognized the fact that evidence was required from the East
Timorese and apparently expected their maximum involvement in the case
within the confines of the Court's statute and rules.
Australia also argued that the people of East Timor had rejected Portugal
as an administering power. This was based on statements made by the
Timorese political parties both before and after the Indonesian invasion. These
groups denied that Portugal had any sovereignty over East Timor, as it was
no longer a colony. This position has changed over the years; Mr. Ramos
Horta, the Permanent Representative of FRETILIN, has stated that the East
Timorese are willing to accept Portugal as East Timor's administering
authority in order for its claim to self-determination to progress.246 In this
case, Australia argued that Portugal's loss of status was also supported by the
general practice of the United Nations and the international community.
Resolutions were passed by the General Assembly in 1973 that withdrew
238. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 31.
239. East Thmor, supra note 1, para. 29.
240. Id. (separate opinion of Judge Vereshchetin).
241. Id. (separate opinion of Judge Vereshchetin) (quoting statements by Professor Correia on behalf
of Portugal).
242. Article 34(1) provides: "Only States may be parties in cases before the Court."
243. East 7lrmor, supra note 1 (separate opinion of Judge Vereshchetin).
244. Id. (separate opinion of Judge Vereshchetin) (citing G.A. Res. 30, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess.,
77th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES137130 (1982)).
245. Id. (separate opinion of Judge Vereshchetin).
246. Jos6 Ramos Horta, Australia and East Thnor, Moving Beyond a Contentious Relationship, in
THE EAST TIMOR CASE IN THE ICJ, supra note 59, at 47, 56.
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Portugal's right to represent its colonies in the United Nations. 247 According
to Australia, Portugal was subsequently referred to as the "administering
Power" for the limited purpose of cooperating with the United Nations in
consultation and negotiation processes; it was certainly not for the purpose of
acting on behalf of the East Timorese.248 Australia also drew support for its
position from the facts that Portugal did not formally or unequivocally protest
the alleged denial of its rights between 1978 and 1985,249 and that voting
patterns of the international community in the General Assembly illustrate the
limited role of Portugal in the settlement process." The Court addressed
this argument only by saying that Portugal would not be considered the
administering power of East Timor on the sole basis of its being given this
title in the United Nations resolutions." The Court did not expressly opine
as to the possible binding nature of the resolutions, 2 but concluded that any
final decision on the status of Portugal as administering power would require
a prior determination on the legality of Indonesia's conduct and the Court
thereby could not rule finally on this contention5 3
In contrast, Judge Weeramantry analyzed this point more extensively.
Judge Weeramantry addressed most of the arguments raisbd by Australia on
this issue. In his dissent, he emphasized the importance of giving effect to the
"sacred trust" provisions in the Charter 54 and asserted that a loss of control
over territory did not mean that the administering power also lost its
status.' 5 He also drew support from the texts of the United Nations General
Assembly resolutions and believed that they were not without legal
consequences for the Member states even though these resolutions are only
recommendatory in nature. 6 Overall, Judge Weeramantry allowed form to
prevail over substance through his interpretation of the resolutions and his
refusal to take voting patterns into account. It was noble to avoid a conclusion
that would "result in the anomalous situation of the current international
system leaving a territory and a people, who admittedly have important rights
opposable to all the world, defenseless and voiceless precisely when those
rights are sought to be threatened or violated."" He neglected, however,
to address the ineffectiveness of Portugal's continuing to hold the title of
administering power when another country was in control of the territory, and
minimized the significance of Portugal's years of inaction.
Portugal also sought to justify its claim on the basis of a service public
247. Counter-Memorial of Australia, supra note 5, 1 244 (citing G.A. Res. 3181, U.N. GAOR, 28th
Sess., 2204th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3181 (1973); G.A. Res. 3113, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess.,
2198th plen. mtg. 11 2, 9(c), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3113 (1973)).
248. Id. 11 243, 245-46.
249. id. 11255-257.
250. Counter-Memorial of Australia, supra note 5, 254. But lack of political activity in the United
Nations does not mean that the right of self-determination disappears. Christine Chinkin, The Merits of
Portugal's Claim Against Australia, 15 U.N.S.W. L.J. 423, 429 (1992); Stepan, supra note 58, at 922.
251. East 71mor, supra note 1, paras. 30-33.
252. Id. para. 32.
253. Id. para. 33.
254. U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-74. Particular reference is made to article 73, e.
255. East 7imor, supra note 1, pt. B(ii) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
256. Id. pt. B(v) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
257. Id. pt. B(iv) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
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international. Due to the restrictive terms of the Court's statute, Portugal
could act in this mode because otherwise, the East Timorese would not be
able to have the dispute adjudicated. Portugal's action on behalf of the
international community concerned erga omnes obligations - obligations that
bind the international community. An action based on a service public
international is capable of encompassing the multilateral aspects of a dispute
as it must necessarily consider issues that have an impact upon the entire
international community.
The ICJ unequivocally stated in Barcelona Traction that a state must be
able to show that it has a legal interest in the subject matter of the decision in
order to bring the claim." s The level of interest required was discussed in
the South West Africa Cases where the Court found that Ethiopia and Liberia
did not have standing to bring the application alleging that South Africa had
infringed its obligations under the mandate. This was because Ethiopia and
Liberia did not have a specific interest greater than that owed to every other
member of the international community that had been violated. The Court
determined in the South West Africa Cases that an actio popularis - a third
party claim made on behalf of the international community - does not exist
in international law. 9
The Court in East Timor did not ultimately deal with these perplexities
as it held that the rule of consent to jurisdiction would effectively override the
operation of the erga omnes rights in question.26 This approach is overly
restrictive and, indeed, regressive. The nature of erga omnes rights is that
they are binding on each state in the international community. It is irrelevant
whether a breach of these obligations occurs by direct conduct of a state or
through the action of another state. It is the actual breach of the obligation that
is important rather than how it occurred. The majority's adoption of this
somewhat contradictory approach exemplifies the tension between the U.N.
Charter model and the Westphalian model. After the development of the right
of self-determination, a right that Judge Skubiszewski goes so far as to
describe as jus cogens,26 the Court could not deny its importance in the
modern international legal system. However, at the same time the Court was
still restricted by its traditional approach to consensual jurisdiction.
Judge Weeramantry's treatment of this issue is much more acceptable
insofar as it truly seeks to satisfy the justice of the case. He believed that the
principles of self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural
resources were the central principles of the case.262 "An erga omnes right
is, needless to say, a series of separate rights erga singulum, including inter
alia, a separate right erga singulum against Australia, and a separate right
erga singulum against Indonesia."263 Consequently, "if the people of East
Timor have a right erga omnes to self-determination, there is a duty lying
258. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 50-51 (Feb. 5).
259. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 34 (June 21).
260. East Thnor, supra note 1, para. 29.
261. Id. para. 135 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting).
262. Id. pt. C (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
263. Id. pt. A, § 3(iii) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
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upon all Member states to recognize that right."'24 He considered Portugal
to have a sufficient interest in the observance of this right due to its status as
265 Weadministering power. Judge Weeramantry held that Australia had violated
these rights as it was "party to an agreement which recognize[d] the
incorporation of a non-self-governing territory in another state and deal[t] with
the principal non-renewable asset of a people admittedly entitled to self-
determination, and without their consent. "266 He further stated that had the
ICJ proceeded to the merits, the Court would have reached a definitive
decision on the consequences of a violation of erga omnes obligations for the
first time. 267 The Court did not address these difficult third-party issues and
simply considered Indonesia as the only third party rather than tackling the
possibility of the international community being a third party with regard to
erga omnes obligations.268 Such a recognition would indeed have been a
felicitous development by the Court in line with the U.N. Charter model and
would have been a great impetus for further recognition of the importance of
nonstate entities as necessary parties in the adjudication of disputes.
B. Conclusion
In dealing with the rights and interests of nonstate entities, the ICJ will
always be confined by the terms of article 34 of its statute. This fact was
recognized by Judge Vereshchetin in his separate opinion in East Timor. It
thus seems that a warranted alteration of the statute would extend article 34
to allow at least organized peoples and international organizations to be parties
to a dispute, if not individuals as well. The fact that organized peoples,
individuals, and international organizations may not be parties to a dispute
before the ICJ does not lead naturally to the conclusion that they would not
or could not constitute necessary parties. To the extent that justice requires
that a nonstate entity be present before the Court, the ICJ should utilize all its
powers to ensure maximum involvement. This could be achieved when erga
omnes rights and obligations are central to the dispute, as was the case in East
Timor. There is no reason why the interests of organized peoples, individuals,
or international organizations should not be protected by the Monetary Gold
principle.
VI. CONCLUSION
East Timor "concerns the Court's jurisdictional reach in the wide range
of third party-related disputes which are increasingly brought before it in a
more closely interrelated world. "269 This Article has argued that there is
inconsistency in the Court's approach to the issues raised by third parties in
264. Id. pt. D, § C(i) (weeramantry, J., dissenting).
265. id. pt. D, § C(iii) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
266. Id. pt. C, § (ii) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); see also id. pt. D, § C(ii) (Weeramantry, J.,
dissenting).
267. Id. pt. D, § C(iii) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
268. Chinkin, Rights But No Remedies, supra note 203, at 107.
269. East 7imor, supra note 1, Introduction (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
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international adjudication, and has analyzed the Court's oscillation in the
context of movement between Cassese's Westphalian and U.N. Charter
models. The ICI's adherence to the tradition of consent as paramount and its
tendency to settle cases within a bilateral framework support the Westphalian
model and reinforce the independent existence of sovereign states. On the
other hand, the Court's inclination to follow the U.N. Charter model was
evident in Nauru where the ICJ went beyond the stark legal dimensions of the
case. The Court has also been prepared to exercise the full reach of its
jurisdiction in cases involving frontier disputes. The Court's shifting approach
in favor of the U.N. Charter model is also apparent in its adaptability
regarding evidentiary problems associated with determining why a state may
constitute a necessary party.
East Timor was the first case since Monetary Gold in which the ICJ
decided that it lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of a necessary party. Any
belief that the Monetary Gold principle had fallen into desuetude was quashed.
The East Timor decision reaffirmed the significance of this principle and has
defined the criteria for its application. The decision firmly entrenched the
prerequisite of determining another state's responsibility prior to a
determination of the dispute before the Court. The Court decided the case
within a bilateral framework by holding that it could not adjudicate the case
between Australia and Portugal in the absence of Indonesia. In so holding, the
majority did not address the future implications of its decision for other states.
The Court also did not consider the impact of its decision on negotiations
among the interested parties in the United Nations. Only Judge Weeramantry,
in his dissenting opinion, attempted to take the multilateral aspects of the
dispute into account, and only he considered the possible application of erga
omnes rights and obligations. The majority decided that the principle of
consent to the settlement of disputes would prevail over erga omnes
obligations. In East Timor, the Westphalian model was paramount over the
U.N. Charter model. Nevertheless, this decision can be viewed as a pragmatic
approach by the ICJ, as states might have withdrawn their acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction if they had believed the Court was prepared to
construe jurisdiction on the broad basis of erga omnes rights and duties.
Unfortunately, such an approach is unnecessarily speculative and is not
conducive to the development of international law. The East Timor decision
failed both to consider the individual responsibility of states and to analyze the
implications of East Timor's status as a non-self-governing territory and the
right of the East Timorese to self-determination.
The acceptance and application of the Monetary Gold principle in East
Timor left unresolved problems concerning multilateral disputes, the interests
of parties other than states, and the apportionment of responsibility to absent
states that are equally culpable of breaching international law. These problems
will inevitably arise in modern international relations due to the increasing
interdependence of states and the increasing role of nonstate subjects in the
international community. The ICJ must integrate political and diplomatic
considerations into its legal adjudication.
Judge Weeramantry has clearly set the example that should be followed
by the other members of the Court. The Court has been oscillating between
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the Westphalian model and the U.N. Charter model in the resolution of
necessary party disputes ever since Monetary Gold. East Timor has not
definitively established the future trend of the Court as the majority took a
step back whereas the dissents of Judges Weeramantry and Skubiszewski
progressed, laying the foundation for change. The potential now clearly exists
for the Court to swing forward toward the greater justice that the U.N.
Charter model provides.

